WHY SUPERVISE BANKS? 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN MONETARY 
SETTLEMENT

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Administrative agencies are generally designed to operate at arm’s length, making rules and adjudicating cases. But the banking agencies are different: they are designed to supervise. They work cooperatively with banks and their remedial powers are so extensive they rarely use them. Oversight proceeds through informal, confidential dialogue.

Today, supervision faces extinction: banks oppose it, the banking agencies restrict it, and scholars misconstrue it. Recently, the critique has turned legal. Supervision’s skeptics draw on a uniform, flattened view of administrative law to argue that supervision is inconsistent with norms of due process and transparency. These arguments erode the intellectual and political foundations of supervision. They also obscure its distinguished past and deny its continued necessity.

This Article rescues supervision and recovers its historical pedigree. It argues that our current understanding of supervision is both historically and conceptually limited. Understanding supervision requires understanding the theory of banking motivating it and revealing the broader institutional order that depends on it. This Article terms that order the “American Monetary Settlement” (“AMS”). The AMS is designed to solve an extremely difficult governance problem—creating an elastic money supply. It uses specially chartered banks to create money and supervisors to act as outsourcers, overseeing the managers who operate banks.

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Supervision is now under increasing pressure due to fundamental changes in the political economy of finance. Beginning in the 1950s, the government started to allow nonbanks to expand the money supply, devaluing the banking franchise. Then, the government weakened the link between supervision and money creation by permitting banks to engage in unrelated business activities. This transformation undermined the normative foundations of supervisory governance, jeopardizing the AMS and ceding public power to private actors. Supervision must be preserved if the AMS is to survive.

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INTRODUCTION

Administrative agencies are generally designed to operate at arm’s length, enforcing broad statutory principles through formal legal proceedings and making generally applicable rules following public notice and comment. In practice, many agencies also operate informally, relying on enforcement discretion and “guidance”—non-binding, rule-like statements of general applicability—to achieve their statutory goals.¹ But the federal banking agencies—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)—are different. They were designed to operate informally; they “supervise.”²

Supervision is a form of governance distinct from rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance. It proceeds through iterative, ongoing, firm-specific engagement.³ In the case of banks, supervision is the product of statutory provisions granting the OCC, Fed, and FDIC unusually capacious approval powers,⁴ monitoring rights,⁵ and

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2. See Guidance, Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of Law: How Do the Banking Agencies Regulate and Supervise Institutions?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Afjs., 116th Cong. 6 (2019) [hereinafter Guidance, Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of Law] (statement of Margaret E. Tahyar, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP) (“Many sectors of the economy today are regulated, but only the banking sector is also supervised.”), Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1168 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (explaining that banks are subject to the “most intensive supervision” of any industry). This Article focuses on national banks supervised by the OCC, bank holding companies and state “member” banks supervised by the Fed, and state “nonmember” banks supervised by the FDIC. It refers to them collectively as “banks.”

The analysis could be extended to federal savings and loan associations, which are special purpose national banks supervised by the OCC. See 12 U.S.C. § 5412. This Article does not treat the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) as a banking agency. Congress created the CFPB in 2010 to eliminate predatory practices at bank and nonbank lenders. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321 (2013).

3. See infra notes 29, 55.

4. The agencies decide if banks can commence business, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 22–27 (national banks); id. § 1815 (insured state nonmember banks); id. § 321 (state member banks); alter their capital structures, see id. §§ 51a, 51b, 57, 59 (national banks); or expand their activities, see id. §§ 21, 24 (national banks); id. § 1844 (bank holding companies); id. § 1831a (insured state banks). They can also veto mergers and acquisitions, id. § 215 (national banks); id. §§ 1842, 1850 (bank holding companies); and place banks into receivership outside of the bankruptcy process (without notice or a hearing), id. § 191 (national banks); id. § 1821 (insured banks).

5. The agencies can review books and records, administer oaths, take testimony, subpoena witnesses, and shield the examination process from public disclosure. See id. § 481 (national...
remedial authorities. For example, the agencies can discipline banks not only when bankers break express legal rules, but whenever, "in the opinion of [the agencies]," bankers are "engaging or ha[ve] engaged, or the [agencies have] reasonable cause to believe . . . [are] about to engage, in . . . unsafe or unsound practice[s]." Rather than specify what sort of practices are "unsafe" or "unsound," Congress authorized the agencies to "define and eliminate" them. And the courts have held that the "discretionary authority" of the agencies to do this "is to be liberally construed."

But unlike the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commission, or other government bodies that apply similar standards ex post to specific circumstances, the banking agencies—by design—almost never end up in court. Instead, they sort things out privately, sharing their safety and soundness concerns through routine communications and confidential letters known as “matters requiring attention” (“MRAs”). For large banks, this dialogue is continuous, with agency examiners working, day in and day out, at offices and desks.

banks); id. § 483 (member banks); id. § 1844(c) (bank holding companies); id. § 1820(b) (insured banks); id. § 1818(n); infra note 95 (citing regulations deeming supervisory work product government property).

6. The agencies can direct banks to claw back bonuses, halt dividends, and divest assets. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b). They can also levy fines and trigger criminal penalties. Id. § 1818(g) (civil money penalties for insured banks); id. § 1818(j) (criminal sanctions for insured banks); id. § 93(b) (civil money penalties for national banks). And they can terminate deposit insurance coverage, id. § 1818(a); revoke charters, id. § 93(a); deny access to cheap government cash, id. § 347b(b)(4); and remove bank executives from office, id. § 1818(e).

7. Id. § 1818(b) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1831p-1 (enabling rulemaking). In the case of cash advances, even this finding is not required; the Fed can cut banks off for no reason at all. Id. § 347b(b)(4); see also supra note 6.

8. Indep. Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Congress expects courts to defer to the agencies whenever a bank “has been harmed or the interests of the depositors have been prejudiced without requiring the agencies to quantify the harm or prejudice.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-222, at 439 (1989) (Conf. Rep.) (for the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act); see also MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors Fed. Resv. Sys., 900 F.2d 852, 862 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he phrase ‘unsafe or unsound banking practice’ is widely used in the regulatory statutes and in case law, and one of the purposes of the banking acts is clearly to commit the progressive definition and eradication of such practices to the expertise of the appropriate regulatory agencies.” (quoting Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (6th Cir. 1978))).

9. Indep. Bankers Ass'n, 613 F.2d at 1168–69. See also Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (describing the comptroller's power over national banks as "plenary").


12. See In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“It is the very rare dispute, however, that culminates in any formal action . . . .”).

inside the bank. In the words of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the supervisory relationship is “extensive and informal”:

It is extensive in that bank examiners concern themselves with all manner of a bank’s affairs. . . . And it is informal in the sense that it calls for adjustment, not adjudication. In the process of comment and response, the bank may agree to change some aspect of its operation or accounting . . . but it is the very rare dispute . . . that culminates in any formal action . . . .

Even the internal appeals mechanism is barely used. This mode of governance—continuous and confidential comment and response geared toward “safety and soundness”—now faces extinction. Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the banking agencies unilaterally disarmed, rolling back their oversight of bank business practices and adopting permissive bright-line rules focused on shareholder equity levels. Agency leaders argued that shareholders would be better stewards of safety and soundness and that government officials and agency staff were not capable of understanding the risks banks were taking.

The result was catastrophic; the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Amid the fallout, legislators were indignant. Where were the supervisors? The government reversed course. President Obama appointed new officials to run the banking agencies, including Daniel Tarullo at the Federal Reserve. Governor Tarullo and his colleagues revived traditional oversight and developed an innovative stress testing program for large financial conglomerates. This program allowed the Fed to control bank dividend payments and share buybacks. Conglomerates strengthened their capital structures, reduced their leverage, and altered their business models.

But now a second “desupervisory” wave is cresting. This time the critique of supervision is not that the market knows best; instead,
it sounds in legal tones. Banks and their advocates argue that supervision is opaque and inconsistent with administrative law norms.\(^{21}\) Increasingly, the agencies agree, citing due process and transparency to justify regularizing bank oversight by shifting (once again) to notice-and-comment rulemaking.\(^{22}\) Thus, in the name of administrative law regularity, the Fed has largely eliminated its stress tests as a disciplining device.\(^{23}\) The Fed has also announced it will put significant supervisory guidance out for comment, remove “bright lines” and “mandatory language,” and cut back on MRAs.\(^{24}\) These efforts have

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\text{22. See, e.g.,} \quad \text{Randal Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Fed. Rsv. Bd. of Governors, Remarks at the Law and Macroeconomics Conference at Georgetown University Law Center: The Global Evolution of Macroprudential Regulation 12 (Sept. 27, 2019) (arguing that supervisory rollbacks are needed to “afford [ ] greater due process to the affected participants”); id. (arguing that the initial stress tests “dispensed with due process considerations”); Randal Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Fed. Rsv. Bd. of Governors, Remarks at the American Bar Association Banking Law Committee Meeting: Spontaneity and Order: Transparency, Accountability, and Fairness in Bank Supervision 12–14 (Jan. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Quarles, Spontaneity and Order] (making recommendations to increase regulatory fairness and transparency); see also \textit{U.S. Dept of the Treasury, A Financial System that Creates Economic Opportunities: Banks and Credit Unions 53} (2017) (recommending that “the Federal Reserve subject its stress-testing and capital planning review frameworks to public notice and comment”).} \\

\text{23. The Fed has released information about its proprietary models, making the tests like bright-line rules: exercises banks can game. The Fed has also reduced testing frequency and limited the consequences for poor performance. See Daniel K. Tarullo, \textit{Are We Seeing the Demise of Stress Testing?}, \textit{Brookings} (June 25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/25/stress-testing/ [https://perma.cc/7M58-SSV3] (“The stress testing regime that is emerging appears little more than a compliance exercise.”).} \\

\text{24. Quarles, Spontaneity and Order, supra note 22, at 15. Similar retrenchment is underway at the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”), which announced it would avoid imposing Fed oversight on nonbank financial institutions and would instead prioritize rulemaking. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 84 Fed. Reg. 9028, 9029 (Mar. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 1310).} \end{align*}\)
culminated in a joint agency rulemaking stating that supervisory guidance and engagement does not create “binding legal obligations for the public” and prohibiting agency officials from “criticizing” banks for failing to comply with it.25 Further easing is almost certainly taking place behind closed doors.26

While scholars and practitioners have challenged some of these changes27 and attacked administrative law monism on analytic grounds,28 they have not returned to the legal, historical, and conceptual bases of supervision. Key questions about the scope of federal law, why it was designed to allow the agencies to proceed informally, and why banks may not be entitled to the same level of transparency and due process as other businesses have gone unasked. It is forgotten that the Supreme Court and leading administrative law theorists once understood banks as one of the most successful (systems of economic regulation), if not the critical process in the federal control of banking is the supervising power, not adjudication or rule making. The supervising power is not and probably cannot be surrounded by formal procedural safeguards . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04, at 247 (1958)); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 44, at 157 (1951) (explaining that “[t]he critical process in the federal control of banking is the supervising power, not adjudication or rule making. The supervising power is not and probably cannot be surrounded by formal procedural safeguards . . . .”); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1828-1861, at 475 (1954) (describing “regular inspection in detail” of bank operations by official agents “with power to act” as “the only effective means of controlling” banks).

29. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 330 (1963) (describing “[f]ederal supervision of banking” as “one of the most successful (systems of economic regulation), if not the most successful” to which “we may owe, in part, the virtual disappearance of bank failures . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04, at 247 (1958)); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 44, at 157 (1951) (explaining that “[t]he critical process in the federal control of banking is the supervising power, not adjudication or rule making. The supervising power is not and probably cannot be surrounded by formal procedural safeguards . . . .”); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1828-1861, at 475 (1954) (describing “regular inspection in detail” of bank operations by official agents “with power to act” as “the only effective means of controlling” banks).
30. Today’s leading casebooks, for example, do not consider banking at all even though the OCC predated the Interstate Commerce Commission by more than two decades and supervision served as a precedent for many aspects of the modern administrative state. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF, GILLIAN E. METZGER, DAVID J. BARRON & ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (12th ed. 2017); STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ADRIAN VERMEULE & MICHAEL HERZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (8th ed. 2017);
agencies are considered, their unusual supervisory methods are undertheorized or ignored. This Article rescues supervision, recovering its past, explaining its rationale, and defending its use. It argues that our current approach to supervision is both historically and conceptually blinkered. Understanding supervision requires understanding the theory of banking that motivated it and the broader institutional order of which it is a part. This Article terms that order the “American Monetary Settlement” (“AMS”). The AMS is a comprehensive solution to an extremely difficult governance problem—creating an “elastic” money supply (i.e., one that expands to support a growing economy). The legislators who established the OCC, the Fed, and the FDIC believed that the power to expand the money supply was too great to leave in the hands of elected bodies and that doing so would lead to corruption, stagnation, and a debased currency. But they were also afraid to allow the power to concentrate in the hands of a few unelected executives. So, they steered a middle course by diffusing the power and constraining it as much as possible. They set up a system of chartered banks whereby anyone willing and able to comply with certain terms and conditions could create money.

The system has four pillars: (1) delegation—privately owned banks, not the government, create the bulk of the money supply; (2) open access—anyone can get a charter to expand the money supply if they are willing to comply with certain terms and conditions; (3) separation—banks cannot engage in commerce and vice versa; and (4) supervision—special government officials, empowered to stamp out “unsound” banking, ensure that banks fulfill their public purpose. Supervisors are not regulators in the classical sense. They are outsourcers. And banks are not like other private businesses. They are

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31. See infra Part I.A (discussing the secondary literature’s treatment and description of banking agencies).

32. Cf. Davidson v. Lanier, 71 U.S. 447, 454 (1866) (Chase, C.J.) (“To keep [the currency] sound, and to guard it as far as possible from fluctuation, are among . . . the most difficult problems of government.”).

33. Bankers were also once prohibited from opening branches in distant cities and towns. Legislators hoped that confining bankers to their local communities would limit abuses, enhance legitimacy, and reduce political discord. See infra Parts I.B, II.A.

34. Soundness is a technical term that reflects the animating purpose of banking law—to augment the money supply with “bank money” that is indistinguishable from a “base” of government-issued cash or coin. It was first adopted by New York and Ohio in the 1840s and added to federal law in 1933. See infra notes 184–188.

35. The degree of delegation, open access, separation, and supervision has varied since these elements were first combined 180 years ago. And the progression has not always been linear. See infra note 47; Parts II, III.
a form of premodern independent agency: they use private shareholders and managers to avoid monetary overissue and politicized asset allocation by the government. Supervisors, in other words, do not restrict private liberty; they enhance it by keeping these “agencies” in check.

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I.A surveys our current revisionist understanding of the banking agencies. It catalogues six scholarly accounts, each of which accepts the premise of the administrative law critique: that banks are just a type of private business entitled to the same sort of procedural protections as any other business. I call this the “licensing model.” While these accounts capture important aspects of contemporary practice, they do not grapple with the unusually broad scope of federal law or the statutory text that gives the agencies a specific, substantive mandate—to eliminate unsafe and unsound banking. Nor can they explain the fact that supervision predates many of the other institutional mechanisms the government has established to bolster the AMS including the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund (the “Fund”) and the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window. Indeed, they obscure the special character of banking that underlies them.

Part I.B advances a theory of bank supervision grounded in banks’ monetary function. It shows that banks are not just a species of for-profit lender. They are a kind of mint, issuing notes and deposits designed to circulate as a medium of exchange and serve as a store of value. Privately owned mints exercise what was once referred to as “delegated” authority. On this view, the banking agencies do not “intervene” in private market activity; they are franchisors, designed to charter banks and ensure that their notes and deposits meet government standards. I call this the “outsourcing model.”

Part II shows why the outsourcing model better comports with the statutory text, legislative history, and a century and a half of agency practice at the state and federal level. Drawing on legislative archives, newspaper accounts, presidential papers, and early administrative law

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37. See infra Part II.


39. See infra notes 134, 253.

40. Banking is a type of “government by contract,” Jody Freeman & Martha Minnow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 1 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009), where the contract is a corporate charter, see WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, 2 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 769 (1917) (“It is well settled that the charter of a corporation is a contract between the state and the corporation.”).
scholarship, it reveals a longstanding, durable commitment to robust discretionary oversight of banking.

First, it recovers the AMS and its origins. The AMS emerged in New York in the 1830s following the collapse of an earlier monetary order imported from Britain. The AMS fused elements of British centralized state authority with American republicanism, inventing supervision—informal, technocratic, and discretionary government oversight—to democratize money creation. The AMS was a compromise. It put the power to expand the money supply in unelected hands. During the Civil War Congress federalized it, rejecting calls to issue the money supply directly. In doing so, Congress empowered a new official in the Treasury Department, the Comptroller of the Currency, to charter and oversee a system of “national banks.” These banks were designed to operate not, individually, as competing private businesses but, collectively, as a sort of third Bank of the United States.

In 1913, in response to a half-century of monetary breakdowns, Congress strengthened the AMS by creating the Federal Reserve. Congress hoped the Fed would coordinate national banks, extend federal oversight to state banks, and avert panics. But the Fed failed to tame state banks, and after the system collapsed in 1933, Congress again faced calls to “nationalize” money creation. And again, it chose a middle path—restoring and strengthening the key planks of the original settlement, especially supervision. It created the FDIC to explicitly backstop bank money for the first time and to subject state banks to federal regulation. And it bolstered informal discretionary oversight by authorizing the Fed to remove bank executives who failed to heed supervisory directives. The result? Individual lending decisions by banks are a matter of “private ordering,” but the banking agencies are empowered to control overall risk levels and fire bankers for unsafe or unsound practices.

This hybrid system, widely lauded, was left untouched by the procedural revolution of the mid-twentieth century. In the 1940s, when policymakers sought to check excesses in the administrative state, the banking agencies, despite their “plenary” authority, were given a pass. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”), which was the product of these reform efforts, sidestepped supervision by focusing on formal actions. And, in 1966, Congress made it easier for the agencies to check banks while avoiding formal proceedings by further expanding their remedial authorities. For example, Congress authorized the agencies to suspend bankers without judicial process and to order

42. See infra notes 278–289 and accompanying text.
bankers to cease and desist from engaging in practices the agencies judged, in their “opinion,” to be “unsafe or unsound.”

Congress’s commitment to supervision did not stop there. In the 1970s and ’80s, as financial globalization transformed the economy and a new wave of reformers again reworked the administrative state, Congress doubled down on iterative, informal bank oversight, reinforcing supervisory governance in 1978, 1983, and 1989. Even in 2001, when Congress removed longstanding structural barriers separating banking from other financial business, it strengthened supervision, adding new approval authorities tied to discretionary agency judgments about the quality of bank management.

Contemporary critics are thus, in one key respect, correct: federal law locates vast power in the hands of the OCC, the Fed, and the FDIC. But it is a category error to view their exercise of this power as a form of administrative lawmaking restricting private liberty. Instead, it is more like government regulating itself—which, in the case of banks, includes the private actors that the government has recruited to expand the money supply. This outsourcing rationale was embraced not just by nineteenth century Treasury secretaries like Alexander Hamilton, Albert Gallatin, and Salmon P. Chase. Twentieth-century policymakers like Franklin D. Roosevelt also saw banks as “agencies” of the government, “supervise[d] [by the government] to see to it that they conform to certain high standards.” Industry complaints about procedural protections, from this perspective, are an attempt to upset the terms of the agreement that permits them to wield monetary powers in the first place. And the decision by government officials to turn to “market discipline” in the late 1990s, and to rulemaking today, conflicts with the basic logic of the AMS—one that recognizes the public functions banks perform.

43. See infra Part II.C.

44. As James Landis put it, when the government acts in a “proprietary” capacity, its actions are “comparable to rules prescribed by any official in a private industry.” JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 21–22 (1938) (describing the Civil Service Commission, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Reconstruction Finance Corporation). The administrative law critique of bank supervision, by contrast, is premised on a view of the relationship between the banking agencies and banks that categorizes the former as public and the latter as private. Cf. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 160 (“[A]dministrators are government functionaries, not businessmen. They are supposed to set and enforce the rules of the game, but not to cross the line that separates the public from the private as if they were playing the game themselves.”). As discussed herein, bank regulation, from its very origins, resists this dichotomy because of banks’ public, monetary function. See infra Part II.

45. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, U.S., Remarks to the American Banker’s Association 2–3 (Oct. 24, 1934) (emphasis added) (draft available from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, File No. 745).

46. These complaints are an example of “transparency’s ideological drift”: the use of transparency arguments to undermine the government’s ability to check private power. David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 102–03 (2018).
Part III attempts to explain why, in the absence of any changes to the statutory bases of agency power, the banking agencies have repudiated supervisory oversight twice in the past two decades. It rejects as incomplete explanations focused on ideological capture. It suggests instead that the problem is structural, and it shows how changes in the theory and practice of banking law have tracked deeper transformations in the political economy of finance.

Durable supervisory governance, it posits, depends on more than just broad agency authority—it requires an alignment of interests between banks and the banking agencies. This alignment first began to falter as far back as the 1950s and ’60s, when the Fed started to allow firms without banking charters to augment the money supply. In the 1990s, Congress extended a government backstop to some of these new “shadow” banks, giving them de facto franchisee status without corresponding oversight. Meanwhile, the banking agencies tried to reflate the value of the banking franchise by allowing banks to engage in previously prohibited activities and by convincing Congress to repeal restrictions on branching. Banks expanded and conglomerated at an unprecedented rate. This transformation put the agencies in the position of overseeing complex new financial businesses that the government has no special role in administering, giving rise to calls to leave monitoring to market participants. And, at the same time, these changes left the agencies unable to oversee, for lack of jurisdiction, money augmentation by nonbanks, the very function they were designed to discipline.

These changes also damaged the norms that sustain the supervisor-banker relationship. Each individual bank was once critical infrastructure. But today many banks are redundant (large conglomerates operate nationwide). Moreover, the largest banks, with vast legal, lobbying, and consulting resources at their disposal, are more capable of resisting supervisory direction and less vulnerable to agency punishment. Appointing new leaders to the banking agencies will not make these problems go away, and so we can expect industry pressure and conflict between the government and large banks to continue to threaten supervisory governance. Unfortunately, with one pillar of the AMS—separations—eroded, supervision has only grown in importance. The most recent fortification of our financial system—stress tests—reflects that. Stress tests sustain what remains of the AMS. Shortsighted efforts to neuter them risk a more radical realignment.47

47. Although the statutory bases of supervision have been strengthened time and again, all four pillars have faced pressures before. Separations were eroded in the 1910s and 1920s, and the government modified delegation and open access in the 1860s, 1910s, 1930s, and 1980s. Some configurations of the AMS delegate more control over the money supply to private hands, others are more weighted toward public officials. See infra Part II.
This Article makes several contributions. It explicates the theoretical and historical foundations of bank supervision, a distinctive form of administrative governance. It describes the AMS and reveals how supervision was designed and strengthened in order to make the AMS politically and economically durable. It puts banking law theory and history into dialogue with administrative law. It categorizes bank supervision as a type of administrative law in which the government acts as an outsourcer rather than as a regulator of private activity. And it shows why recent challenges to supervision are misplaced and efforts by the agencies to “normalize” their procedures are inconsistent with nearly two centuries of practice.

I. TWO APPROACHES TO BANKING LAW

Banking law is theoretically adrift. Most contemporary scholarship accepts a mistaken view of what banks are and what they do. I call this view the licensing model. The licensing model casts banks

48. In doing so, it pursues administrative law pluralism, which is a worldview that used to be common, but has faded in recent decades. See, e.g., James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law – The Walter-Logan Bill, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1080 (1940);

Just as the architect follows different conceptions when creating a railroad station and building a hanger, the administrative agencies we have created have had both their organization and procedure shaped largely by the tasks with which they were confronted. It would be silly, for example, to build the same structure for a bank as for a railroad station; equally absurd is it to insist that the details of organization and operation of the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Reserve Board shall be alike;

Leonard D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (4th ed. 1955) (describing various administrative forms and structures from executive departments and independent regulatory commissions to government corporations); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1670 n.5 (1975) (emphasizing the importance of differences in agency forms and structures). For an example of contemporary pluralism that is also applicable to bank supervision, see Charles Sabel, Gary Herrigel & Peer Hull Kristensen, Regulation Under Uncertainty: The Coevolution of Industry and Regulation, Regul. & Governance, June 2017, at 2 (examining recursive systems of cooperative governance designed “to formulate and update detailed plans for risk identification and mitigation that no central rulemaker could possibly hope to approximate”).

49. It thus deepens efforts to explain the “special” relationship between financial regulators and administrative law (at least in the case of the banking agencies). See Note, Cashing Out a Special Relationship: Trends Toward Reconciliation Between Financial Regulation and Administrative Law, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1183, 1185–87 (2017) (examining differences between financial regulation and other forms of regulation); Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 L. & Contemp. Prosbs. 129, 144 (2015) (arguing that financial regulation is geared toward enabling private market activity rather than constraining it); Thomas W. Merrill, A Comment on Metzger and Zaring: The Quicksilver Problem, 78 L. & Contemp. Prosbs. 189, 199 (2015) (arguing that financial activities are too malleable to restrain through ex ante rulemaking). In doing so, it builds on recent efforts to recover the role that banks play in the economy. See infra notes 124–126. And it addresses a longstanding gap in the administrative law literature; even mid-century administrative law scholarship failed to account for the distinctiveness of the banking agencies. See infra note 121.
as garden variety financial intermediaries. A better framework recognizes that banks are “special”: they create money as well as invest it. On this view, the banking agencies are outsourcers. The “outsourcing model” is both more theoretically sound and better reflects the underlying assumptions of the nearly two-century-old AMS.

This Part maps the current terrain of banking law scholarship and outlines an alternative approach: the outsourcing model. The outsourcing model recognizes banks’ role in our monetary framework and grounds the historical recovery that follows.

A. The Licensing Model

This Section examines six ways scholars and practitioners describe the banking agencies and their distinctive methods of oversight. Each embraces the licensing model, which treats banks as privately owned financial intermediaries that borrow from people who have too much money (savers) and lend to people who don’t have enough (borrowers). The licensing model emphasizes the virtues of private ordering, downplays the distinctiveness of money, and frames the role of the banking agencies as correcting market failures. Most notably, it focuses on the fact that banks, unlike other lenders, are (and should be) subject to extensive oversight because they are particularly prone to runs.

These runs are caused by information asymmetries (e.g., bank creditors do not effectively monitor bank managers) and coordination problems (e.g., bank creditors are numerous and diffuse), which government interventions such as capital regulation and deposit insurance correct by reducing the likelihood of creditor losses and aligning the incentives of shareholders and creditors. On the licensing

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51. See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 401 (1983) (arguing that banks are susceptible to damaging runs).


53. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 51, at 401.
view, the banking agencies aid in these efforts (and address resulting moral hazard) by enforcing capital regulations, facilitating market discipline, combatting regulatory arbitrage, limiting the government’s financial exposure to banks, bolstering creditor confidence, and reducing systemic risk. In other words, bank supervisors are “rule enforcers,” “discipline facilitators,” “gap fillers,” “agents” of the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, “confidence legitimators,” and “macroprudential stewards.”

1. Supervisors as Rule Enforcers

Perhaps the most popular account of the banking agencies goes something like this: Bank balance sheets are complex and opaque, and the regulatory rulebook is long and technical. A special group of experts is needed to promulgate these bright-line strictures and ensure that bankers comply with them, so Congress created the banking agencies and endowed them with “monitoring” powers. Former Fed Governor Fredric Mishkin takes this view: “The government establishes regulations to reduce [bank] risk taking and then supervisors monitor banks to see that they are complying with these regulations and not taking on excessive risk.”

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54. This list is not exhaustive. Kris Mitchener and Matthew Jaremski suggest that one of the roles of the banking agencies is to protect vested interests by blocking new entrants. Kris James Mitchener & Matthew Jaremski, The Evolution of Bank Supervisory Institutions: Evidence from American States, 75 J. ECON. HIST. 819, 822–24 (2015). The agencies also sometimes act as “agricultural extension agents,” diffusing big city wisdom to small-town bankers, and as “consultants,” conducting horizontal reviews and spreading best practices while guarding trade secrets. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 307 (2011) (explaining that supervisors before the crisis “acted something like consultants, working with banks to assess the adequacy of their systems”); WILLIAM H. KNIFIN, JR., THE PRACTICAL WORK OF A BANK 349 (1915) (“The examiner going from bank to bank acquires a fund of information that he can use to advantage . . . . and can advise the officers in many things to their profit.”). There is also evidence that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the banking agencies facilitated correspondent banking by allowing money center banks to deal in the notes of distant rural outfits. I have been unable, however, to find any sources asserting that these functions are the purpose of supervisory law. Cf. Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail-In? And How!, 20 Fed. RSrv. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 207, 215 (2014) (suggesting that supervisors may be agents of a bank’s creditors, agents of its top management, auditors, or employees of an “agricultural extension service” for banking).

55. See Van Loo, supra note 1, at 384–86 (subsuming bank supervision within ordinary administrative practice by highlighting its similarities to “regulatory monitoring”). Supervision, as described herein, involves more than just this sort of monitoring. Many agencies monitor, see id. at 409–10, including the CFPB, see Levitin, supra note 2, at 355–57, but monitoring alone does not create iterative, ongoing, firm-specific governance.

56. Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the Issues?, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T 1, 8 (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001); see also Heidi Richards, Influence and Incentives in Financial Institution Supervision, in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 73, 81 (A. Joanne Kellermann, Jakob de Haan & Femke de Vries eds., 2013) (explaining that it “is commonly asserted that supervisors mainly enforce ‘compliance’ with prudential requirements” and that the “prominence of [the] compliance
supervisors as “adjudants” to the regulatory apparatus “directed at assessing the adequacy of a bank’s capital” under the Basel Accord.57 And former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke had this “rule enforcers” model in mind when he explained in 2006 that supervisory actions are tied “to a bank’s leverage and risk-based capital ratios.”58

Other commentators adopt the supervisor-as-rule-enforcer model in part, distinguishing it from the stress testing approach taken by supervisors more recently. For example, Peter Conti-Brown writes:

Before the 2008 financial crisis . . . the line between “bank regulation” and “bank supervision” was relatively easy to summarize. “Regulation” was the rulemaking that administrative agencies issued pursuant to some statutory authority. “Supervision” was the micro-application of regulation to individual firms, a kind of check-the-box exercise that ensured that the supervisors saw in the banks what the regulators wanted them to see. In other words, the regulators made the rules, and the supervisors made sure the rules were followed.59

“Rule enforcer” accounts also sometimes highlight the role that monitoring plays in shaping rules: because agencies get up close and personal with bank employees, they can glean information that will allow them to refine their strictures over time.60

2. Supervisors as Discipline Facilitators

Of course, the banking agencies cannot be only rule enforcers, at least as a matter of statutory design. Title 12 of the U.S. Code specifically differentiates between violations of law and unsafe and

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57. Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 10 (2014).


60. See Eisenbach et al., supra note 13, at 21–28.
unsound practices, empowering the banking agencies to take corrective actions in both cases. The Code also repeatedly distinguishes between supervision and enforcement, treating the former as distinct from the latter. Two other approaches better account for the discretionary and informal practice of bank oversight by accepting the rule enforcers model as a baseline and refining it.

One of these approaches dominated official accounts of supervision in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. This framework imagines supervisors as facilitators of market discipline. Supervisory powers are necessary, this view holds, because banks are opaque and agency problems between bank shareholders and bank managers threaten to undermine financial stability. As Robert Clark put it, “[A] financial intermediary’s assets consist of intangible claims,” which—absent special regulation—“would be easy for the management of an intermediary to sell . . . and replace . . . with new claims that in the aggregate constitute a portfolio with a radically different level of risk.”

The opacity of bank risk taking is problematic because, in the words of former Fed Governor Lawrence Meyer, “markets cannot operate well without transparency.” The “prerequisite for market discipline” of banks, according to Meyer, “is more rapid dissemination of information [to the market, and the] provision to market participants of critical and timely information about risk exposures by the [banks] themselves.” The government must “intervene” to ensure that this information reaches market participants because “[p]ublic disclosure is not going to be easy for bankers [as] it may well bring new pressures that [managers] may not like in the short run.”

On this view, the banking agencies “independently test and compare systems and models to best practices” and “review[ ] [bank] disclosures to confirm that . . . [a] bank’s actual disclosures are consistent with its own policy.” Safety and soundness authority and informal, iterative engagement allow the agencies to both enforce the

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61. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b). Many policymakers likely subscribe to the “rule enforcers” view for normative reasons. I call these individuals “rule absolutists.” Menand, supra note 17, at 1584. They oppose discretionary government action on principle because they think it jeopardizes first-order liberty interests.

62. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831bb; id. at § 4806 (listing various “supervisory determinations”). Professor Tarullo catalogues many further examples in forthcoming work.

63. Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 14–15 (1976) (arguing that “financial intermediaries can shift their aggregate risk levels more readily than other corporations”).

64. Laurence H. Meyer, Supervising Large Complex Banking Organizations: Adapting to Change, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T, supra note 56, at 97, 100.

65. Id.

66. Id. at 102.

67. Id. at 99, 102.
public’s rules and strengthen “private regulation.” The Fed, under the leadership of Alan Greenspan, made this sort of market-oriented oversight official policy in the late 1990s and dubbed it “risk-focused supervision” (“RFS”).

Many subsequent commentators depict RFS as a salutary advance from what they assume preceded it: a pure rule-enforcement model. Others suggest that facilitating market discipline has always been the purpose of supervisory law. According to the latter group, the point of the Fed’s postcrisis stress tests is (or should be) to enhance transparency so that the market can identify weaknesses and force banks to correct them. As will become clear, such approaches leave parts of the law unexplained, including its emphasis on supervisory secrecy and its panoply of remedial sanctions. Moreover, these approaches are historically ungrounded—inconsistent with not only the legislative history of Title 12 but also with agency practice prior to Greenspan’s tenure.

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68. *Id.* Meyer’s model rests on Greenspan’s diktat that, since the “self-interest of market participants generates private market regulation,” the “real question” for government “is not whether a market should be regulated,” but “whether government intervention strengthens or weakens private regulation.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsv. Sys., Remarks at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Government Regulation and Derivatives Contracts (Feb. 21, 1997).

69. See *Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsv. Sys., The Federal Reserve System: Purposes & Functions* 63 (9th ed. 2005) (“The goal of the risk-focused supervision process is to identify the greatest risks to a banking organization and assess the ability of the organization’s management to identify, measure, monitor, and control these risks.”); see also Eisenbach et al., *supra* note 13, at 9 (identifying the advent of RFS in the 1990s). RFS was designed to complement capital regulations promulgated in the late 1980s and 1990s. Greenspan and Meyer designed these regulations to address, in Greenspan’s words, the “needs for larger shock absorbers and for increased private incentives to monitor and control [bank] risk.” Alan Greenspan, *Innovation and Regulation of Banks in the 1990s*, 74 Fed. Rsv. Bul. 783, 784 (1998).

70. For example, Mitchener and Jaremski argue that supervision lessens “asymmetric information . . . by providing [an] independent collaboration of accounting information and by checking for management fraud.” Mitchener & Jaremski, *supra* note 54, at 835. On their account, supervision evolved to “promote product and price competition and to enforce legal restrictions on bank activity.” *Id.* Eugene White argues that facilitating market discipline was the original purpose of federal supervision and bemoans the shift toward government policing post-1913. See Eugene N. White, *Lessons from the History of Bank Examination and Supervision in the United States, 1863-2008, in Financial Market Regulation in the Wake of Financial Crises* 15, 18, 38–39 (Alfredo Gigiobianco & Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009) (arguing that, until 1913, “supervision [was] primarily aimed at reinforcing market discipline”).


72. See, e.g., Gerald Dunne, *The Legal Basis of Bank Supervision, in Bank Supervision* 6, 8–9 (1963) (explaining that the “widespread consequences of misconduct or bad judgment” at a bank “are such as to require governmental rather than market sanction”).
3. Supervisors as Gap-Fillers

A third model of supervision conceives of safety and soundness as a “gap-filling principle” and supervision as “the regulatory gap-filler.” Congress left it to the agencies,” Heidi Mandanis Schooner explains, “to decide what practices are unsafe or unsound,” because safety and soundness law is designed “to close the gaps in the regulatory framework.” As banking is highly complex, “neither Congress nor the federal banking agencies could (or should) attempt to regulate specifically each and every bank activity.” It would be “prohibitively costly” to write all these rules and, given how fast things change, not likely to work.

On this view, supervision complements rule writing, which is backward-looking, because supervision allows the banking agencies to make law ex post at the point of application. For example, it allows the agencies to deem a specific bank investment “unsafe and unsound” even if the investment complies with the rules. Many observers who argue Congress created the agencies to enforce bright-line rules contend that, in recent years, supervisors have become more focused on using their authority to close holes in the regulatory framework.

Although I have not seen it in any of the literature, one could imagine a law and economics explanation for supervision that proceeds along these lines: The problem with banking is that banks cannot devise verifiable debt covenants (ones for which a breach can be proven in a courtroom). A small nonverifiable change in volatility, easily adopted in finance, can change the risk profile of a high-leverage business like a bank dramatically. As private bank creditors cannot be expected to provide extra-corporate governance, the solution is a form of contingent

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74. Id. at 187.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 187–88. See also PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE 469 (2018) (noting that “finance is a shape shifter,” “[r]egulatory arbitrage is endemic, and the rule writers can end up chasing their tails”).
78. See, e.g., ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 59, at 582: [Supervision, with its emphasis on] discretion and judgment . . . is a reflection of both the resource constraints faced by regulators and the reality that it is simply unrealistic to expect them to write—or, crucially, to update on a timely basis—a prudential rulebook capable of prescribing the most desirable course of action in every potential future state of the world in which market participants may find themselves;
A. Joanne Kellermann & Robert H.J. Mosch, Good Supervision and Its Limits in the Post-Lehman Era, in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 56, at 1, 5 (arguing that supervision must shift to “tackle the possible root causes of later problems before they even translate into deteriorating solvency and liquidity ratios”).
79. But see infra notes 98–99 (articulating a related theory).
governance—government supervision—with the power to intervene even in the absence of verifiable events.

The “gap-filler” model might also be flipped on its head. To address rule incompleteness, the government could be said to intentionally overregulate banks, using the banking agencies to selectively waive requirements after the fact. In other words, supervision might reflect the need for what Jason Scott Johnston calls, in the retail context, “tailored forgiveness”—the ability to reward those who behave non-opportunistically.\textsuperscript{80} I am not aware of anyone who has made this argument for supervision in banking,\textsuperscript{81} but there is support for it in practice.\textsuperscript{82}

4. Supervisors as Agents of the Fund and Reserve Banks

All three of the abovementioned theories treat bright-line rules as the foundation of banking law and treat the agencies as enforcing those rules in one way or another. But they miss that most of the rules, including modern capital requirements, grew out of supervisory guidance issued in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{83} That guidance was designed to clarify official expectations during a period of declining bank profitability so that banks would not be surprised by cease and desist orders.\textsuperscript{84} Indeed, it was only subsequent policy changes that led scholars to see supervision as a gap-filler instead of rules as a fail-safe.

A fourth theory stands out from these approaches by emphasizing the government’s role in banking. This theory attributes informal discretionary oversight to the fact that (1) the FDIC insures most bank liabilities, making the FDIC, in effect, every bank’s primary creditor and (2) the Federal Reserve Banks extend discount window loans and intraday credits to banks to facilitate payments, accepting transfers of bank deposits as money. Supervisors, on this view, are agents of the Fund and of the Reserve Banks—government bodies in privity with the banks. Supervisors’ broad powers minimize the government’s financial exposure to banks and protect the government’s


\textsuperscript{81} Kenneth Abraham argues that “tailored forgiveness” might be one reason why governments might not offer insurance directly. Kenneth Abraham, \textit{Four Conceptions of Insurance}, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 687 (2013). Something similar may be at work in the government’s choice to outsource money creation to banks.

\textsuperscript{82} Indeed, “regulatory forbearance” in the 1980s raised so many concerns that Congress actually restricted the power of the banking agencies to ignore certain rule violations. \textit{See} 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (requiring banking agencies to take prompt corrective action).

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{See} Menand, \textit{supra} note 17, at 1551–52.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{See id.} at 1561–62.
contractual rights; private market actors with similarly large contingent claims, the thinking goes, would demand similar authority.

Richard Carnell, Jonathan Macey, and Geoffrey Miller advance this view in their textbook. And officials sometimes speak about supervision in this manner. Statutory support for this interpretation can be found in section 21 of the Federal Reserve Act, which provides that “examinations shall be so conducted as to inform the Federal reserve bank of the condition of its member banks and of the lines of credit which are being extended by them.” But, as discussed shortly, this view overlooks the purpose of the Fed’s lending programs and the Insurance Fund, and it does not grapple with the establishment of the OCC during the Civil War or the subsequent development of supervisory law in the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s.

5. Supervisors as Confidence Legitimators

A fifth theory emphasizes the role of supervisors in promoting market confidence. According to this view, the banking agencies are empowered so that they can credibly provide a governmental stamp of approval to prevent skittish depositors and other bank creditors from withdrawing their deposits during periods of economic uncertainty. Carnell, Macey, and Miller describe a version of this theory in their textbook, without fully subscribing to it, and a similar logic suffuses

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85. Carnell et al., supra note 50, at 440 ("[D]eposit insurance . . . gave supervision a new rationale: protecting the insurance funds. Now the bank supervisor acts, in a sense, as agent for the fund."). See also Tucker, supra note 77, at 448, 459.

86. Narayana Kocherlakota, Speech at the Allied Executives Business & Economic Outlook Symposium: The Economy and Why the Federal Reserve Needs to Supervise Banks (Mar. 2, 2010) (arguing that supervision is necessary because if the “Federal Reserve makes a bad loan . . . through the discount window, that loss appears on its balance sheet”).


88. Nor can it account for the Federal Home Loan Banks, which provide liquidity to banks to support housing finance and take much greater risk in their dealings with banks despite having no supervisory powers. See Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 795, 821–27 (2014).

89. Carnell et al., supra note 50, at 440 (explaining that before deposit insurance, “supervision played a crucial role in preventing runs” and that, in that regard, “[p]erception mattered as much as reality” because “if the public believed that banks were strictly supervised, it would be less likely to lose confidence in a bank at the first ugly rumor of problems”). Mitchener and Jaremski also argue supervision might be necessary because depositors are “[u]nable to discern if bank managers [take] on too much risk or [are] committing fraud,” so, absent a government stamp of approval, “would be reluctant to put money in the bank.” Mitchener & Jaremski, supra note 54, at 835.

90. See Carnell et al., supra note 50, at 440.
some recent assessments of the Fed’s postcrisis stress testing regime.\textsuperscript{91} Anne Khademian, in a monograph focused on supervisory autonomy and accountability, also adopts this framework.\textsuperscript{92}

Although there are superficial similarities between the “confidence legitimator” and “market discipline” views (both, for example, are oriented toward private markets), the two in fact sit in tension. After all, if confidence is the goal of supervision, problems at banks are best worked out in private, between agency officials and bank executives. Secrecy is a virtue because it helps obscure weaknesses that might undermine trust in banks. By contrast, if market discipline is the goal, secrecy is a sin because it prevents market actors from policing bad practices. The government should advertise information about bank weaknesses widely so that bankers are incentivized to address them.

Current law is more consistent with the confidence legitimator view as it shields potentially damaging information about banks from the market through the common law bank examiners’ privilege,\textsuperscript{93} statutory provisions exempting supervisors from the Freedom of Information Act,\textsuperscript{94} and regulations requiring banks and supervisors to treat supervisory work product as government property.\textsuperscript{95} The bread and butter of modern supervisory oversight—MRAs—is never released

\textsuperscript{91} See Ong & Pazarbasioglu, \textit{supra} note 71, at 16 (emphasizing the importance of stress tests as a way to build credibility). Supervisory stress tests are necessary, on this view, not to enable the agencies to identify weak banks and force them to take corrective actions, but to signal to the market that the banks are trustworthy counterparties. \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{92} Anne M. Khademian, \textit{Checking on Banks: Autonomy and Accountability in Three Federal Agencies} 29 (1996) (“Banking is a business of risk that depends on depositor and investor confidence. The examination profession must facilitate that confidence by restricting risks that threaten safety . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{93} See, e.g., Martinez v. Rocky Mountain Bank, 540 F. App’x 846, 854 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the bank examination privilege); Eric B. Epstein, \textit{Why the Bank Examination Privilege Doesn’t Work as Intended}, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL. 17, 18 n.4 (2017) (noting that “the bank examination privilege is recognized in every federal circuit”).

\textsuperscript{94} See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (exempting information “contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions”); see also Pub. Inv. Arb. Bar Ass’n v. SEC, 930 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Pub. Inv. Arb. Bar Ass’n v. SEC, 771 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he primary reason for adoption of exemption 8 was to ensure the security of financial institutions. Specifically, there was [a] concern that [the] disclosure of . . . reports containing frank evaluations of . . . banks might undermine public confidence and cause unwarranted runs on banks.” (citation omitted) (quoting Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 534 (1978))); S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 9 (1965) (“Exemption No. 8 is directed specifically to insuring the security of our financial institutions by making available only to the Government agencies . . . examination, operating, or condition reports . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{95} See 12 C.F.R. § 4.32(b) (2020) (defining “[n]on-public OCC information” to include materials related to examinations and supervisory activities); \textit{id}. § 261.2(c)(1)(iii) (defining “[c]onfidential supervisory information” for the Fed to include documents prepared in connection with supervisory activities); \textit{id}. § 309.5(g)(8) (defining “[e]xempt information” for the FDIC to include examination materials).
to the public nor are annual supervisory assessments of bank health, including the composite scores that supervisors calculate and which determine whether banks can pay out capital to their shareholders.\textsuperscript{96}

6. Supervisors as Macroprudential Stewards

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a sixth way of conceptualizing the banking agencies emerged, one that highlights system-level fragilities, moral hazard, and the tendency of the government to recapitalize banks when they get in trouble. This final view treats markets and rules as perhaps sufficient to ensure microprudential soundness—the solvency of individual banks. But holds that the state also has a special interest in \textit{macroprudential} stability, an interest that requires and justifies discretionary government oversight of banks and other financial institutions that pose “systemic” risks.\textsuperscript{97}

As Mathias Dewatripont, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Jean Tirole explain:

The only way of breaking the vicious circle of recurrent banking crises, fed by phases of speculative mania, is to give the agencies in charge of banking supervision the power to take charge of troubled banks \textit{before} they really endanger the funds of their small depositors and/or the stability of the financial system.\textsuperscript{98}

In other words, “shareholders must be open to expropriation, and managers must be dismissed \textit{before} banks default.”\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{96} Perhaps unsurprisingly those who think that supervisors should facilitate market discipline are eager to remove these restrictions. \textit{See, e.g., Guidance, Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of Law}, supra note 2, at 3 (arguing that the scope of restricted supervisory information should “be narrowed to the core minimum necessary”); \textit{see also} Alfred Dennis Mathewson, \textit{From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role of Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks}, 11 J. CORP. L. 139, 176 (1986) (arguing that “public disclosure” of bank regulatory information “must be systematic and continuous”).

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{See generally} Robert Hockett, \textit{The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and Soundness’ to Systemic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision}, 9 VA. L & BUS. REV. 201, 204 (2015) (describing that a hallmark of macroprudential policy is a focus on “financial stability”). This view was once conventional wisdom. \textit{See} Tucker, supra note 77, at 446; George Blunden, Supervision and Central Banking, Bank of England Q. Bul. 380–85 (1987) (“It is part of the [supervisor’s] job to take [a] wider systemic view and sometimes to curb practices which even prudent banks might, if left to themselves, regard as safe.”).

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Mathias Dewatripont, Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis} 74 (Keith Tribe trans., 2010). This view resembles, in part, Leonard White’s view that legislatures created bank commissions because the right to sue an insolvent bank is an empty protection. \textit{White, supra} note 48, at 464 (“Preventive, not punitive, measures were required, and these could be taken only by the executive branch, through administrative agencies armed with inquisitorial and other powers.”). \textit{See also} Tucker, supra note 77, at 68 (explaining that after a banking collapse “the losers are never going to be able to recover their costs from the ‘financial polluters’ because the banks and other intermediaries are bust” and accordingly “[s]tability warrants state intervention to reduce the probability of crises and to limit how bad they are”).

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Dewatripont et al., supra} note 98, at 74.
WHY SUPERVISE BANKS?

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law in 2010, reflects this approach. For example, it created the Financial Stability Oversight Council to extend Fed supervision to nonbank financial companies that pose systemic risks, and it set up a bank-like, government-imposed resolution process for nonbank financial institutions whose failure might jeopardize financial stability. The Fed’s supervisory stress tests can also be justified on these grounds, as they are explicitly geared toward protecting the economy from an undercapitalized banking system.

B. The Outsourcing Model

Although the abovementioned theories accurately describe many aspects of supervisory practice, none are wholly consistent with the design of the banking agencies. Even the agent model, which highlights the government’s special role, casts the government as just another market actor in the banking system. The actual relationship between the state and the banking system is closer to the reverse: banks are government instrumentalities with private managers acting in a public capacity. This becomes clear if one recognizes that banks are more than just lenders with unusually volatile funding. Banks create money as well as invest it. Once money creation in addition to investment is recognized, the banking system is better conceived of as an outsourcing scheme: (1) banks expand the money supply (2) on behalf of the government and (3) banking agencies act as franchisors by chartering banks and supervising their work.

1. Banks as Mints

It is a basic principle of macroeconomics that banks create money. Indeed, banks create most of the money in the economy. Although the Treasury Department prints—and the Federal Reserve...
System issues—the cash in your wallet,104 households and businesses use little cash as a means of payment or store of value. Instead, they rely primarily on promises to pay cash issued by privately owned banks—exchanging them as if they were cash. This “bank money” (also known as “inside money”) can take many forms.105 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the most common form of it was physical paper called “bank notes”; today, it is bank account balances called “deposits,” “checkbook money,” or “account money.”106 Deposits are a “credit” on the books of a bank that serve as a store of value and a means of payment.107 Banks create deposits by crediting accounts (using the “bookkeeper’s pen”) when they originate loans. In other words, banks lend to account holders by plussing up their balances.109

Today, only the Federal Reserve is permitted to circulate paper notes—and they are no longer redeemable for gold and silver coins.110 But privately owned banks still have a legal monopoly on account
money. And given the dominance of this form of money in everyday life, deposits are what counts. These banks can expand the supply of account money, triggering inflation, or contract the supply of account money, triggering deflation, regardless of how much cash the Fed puts into circulation. Indeed, the only way that cash enters circulation is through banks when depositors withdraw it. Although borrowers can normally redeem account money for cash, banks hold little cash on hand, and the total supply of it (around $1.8 trillion) represents a fraction of outstanding deposit balances ($15 trillion).  

2. Minting as Governing

One way to conceptualize money creation is as a special province of the state. There are many reasons to adopt this view (although adopting it is not critical for the historical recovery that follows). These reasons include its doctrinal pedigree, its constitutional

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112. There are other ways. See, e.g., GEORGE SELIGMAN, MONEY: FREE AND UNFREE (2017) (treating government as an interloper in private monetary arrangements); FREDRICH HAYEK, THE DENATIONALIZATION OF MONEY 12 (1976) (offering “the revolutionary proposal to replace state control of the money supply by competing private issuers in the market”); LUDWIG VAN MISES, THE THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT 43–57 (1912) (proposing a “return to sound [non-state] money”). Indeed, the licensing model is founded, at least implicitly, on a market theory of money, in which money is conventional and a state is not needed for its creation. See, e.g., JOHN HICKS, THE MARKET THEORY OF MONEY (1989) (outlining a market theory of money). This view is traceable chiefly to John Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 56–66 (1690); JOHN LOCKE, SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOWERING OF INTEREST AND RAISING THE VALUE OF MONEY (1691); see also CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COINS, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM 330–59 (2014) (discussing the influence of John Locke).

113. It suffices to say that this is how most of the legislators who wrote our banking laws and forged the AMS understood banking.

114. Recognition of the sovereign’s authority over money creation is as old as the Anglo-American legal tradition itself. See DESAN, supra note 112, at 93 (“The Anglo-Saxon rule that ‘there shall run one coinage throughout the realm’ date[s] to the reign of Athelstan in 930.”). The Privy Council sitting as the highest court in Britain decided the canonical case in 1605. See The Case of Mixed Money in Ireland, Trin. 2 JAMES I. A.D. 1605, reprinted in COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 114–30, 118 (1809) (“[T]he King by his prerogative may make money of what matter and form he pleaseth, and establish the standard of it, so may he change his money in substance and impression, and enhance or debase the value of it, or entirely decree and annul it.”); id. at 116 (No other person, the Council noted, could make money “without special license or commandment of the king”). Blackstone affirmed the principle. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *276 (“[M]oney is the medium of commerce, it is the king’s prerogative, as the arbiter of domestic commerce, to give it authority or make it current [i.e. to declare it to be legal tender].”). The Supreme Court adopted the Privy Council’s holding in 1871. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 565–66 (1871) (noting that “the power given to Congress to coin money and regulate the value thereof . . . [was] much discussed in the great case of Mixed Moneys . . . and it was there held to belong to the king’s ordinary prerogative over the coinage of money,” which later became Parliament’s, and that, in the United States, whether the standard of money should be changed is “undoubtedly” a question of “legislative discretion”); see also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 549 (1869) (upholding a prohibitive tax on state bank notes); Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218
status,\textsuperscript{115} and its theoretical underpinnings.\textsuperscript{116} But let me offer two further reasons.\textsuperscript{117}

First, whatever one thinks about the power to issue money generally, the power to issue money denominated in the state’s unit of account is very much the state’s concern. For example, the federal government uses the dollar\textsuperscript{118} and issues monetary instruments denominated in dollars. Other entities that issue instruments denominated in dollars (like banks) debase the value of dollars issued by the United States to the extent that the dollars they issue are used to satisfy dollar demand in the economy. For example, prices would be much lower if there were only $1.8 trillion in circulation (i.e., if people did not write bank checks denominated in dollars) because people who wanted to hold their wealth in dollars would have to get their hands on dollars issued by the government. Since most governments rely on their money to tax and spend, private activity that changes the value of government-issued money poses a significant risk.\textsuperscript{119}

Second, the power to create money in a monetary economy, one in which most goods and services and tangible and intangible assets have prices, is the power to govern the motions of economic life. For example, when a borrower comes to a bank to finance a new venture, the bank is not constrained by the amount of cash that already exists.

\begin{quote}
U.S. 302, 310 (1910) (“The power to ‘coin money and regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,’ is a prerogative of sovereignty and a power exclusively vested in the Congress of the United States.”); Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 304 (1935) (“[T]here attaches to the ownership of gold and silver those limitations which public policy may require by reason of their quality as legal tender and as a medium of exchange.” (citing Ling Su Fan, 218 U.S. at 310)).

115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (“Congress shall have [the] Power . . . To coin Money [and] regulate the Value thereof.”); id. § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 361 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (“[The King] is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can . . . coin money [and] authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin.”). In the eighteenth century, the verb “to coin” meant “to make or forge anything” and it was common to speak of “coin money” paper money. See Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the Coinage Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1062–63, 1063 n.282 (2008) (collecting two dozen examples).

116. See Robert C. Hockett, Rousseauvian Money 14 (Cornell Legal Stud. Rch. Paper Series, Paper No. 18-48, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278408 [https://perma.cc/V3BP-TXHG]. It also seems likely that successful moneys, including money issued by nonstate actors, are the product of state power and its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. See GEORG FRIEDRICH KNAPP, THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY 1 (1905) (arguing that money is a creation of the state); GEOFFREY INGHAM, THE NATURE OF MONEY 74–80 (2004) (similar); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 8 (1969) (arguing that money provision is “an essential governmental function on a par with the provision of a stable legal framework”).


The bank can empower the borrower to requisition the necessary social resources by creating new money instruments out of thin air. This sort of governing power has long been of central concern to states, which have generally constrained the sorts of projects that can be financed in this way (and constrained the amounts of money banks can create) in an effort to direct this power toward certain ends.\footnote{See Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: Legal Remedies to Recessions (2019).}

3. Supervisors as Outsourcers

If we recognize banks’ role as the primary source of monetary elasticity, and the government’s explicit and implicit backstopping of the money banks issue, banking law figures as an elaborate outsourcing scheme. Supervisory authority is broad because banks are franchisees and the banking agencies are franchisors. Yes, the franchisors enforce rules, fill gaps, legitimate confidence, combat moral hazard, and mitigate macroprudential risks. But the franchisors perform these functions because the government is the proprietor of the system, governing through banks to expand the money supply. And the unusual nature of supervisory power—the ability of the banking agencies to enter banks uninvited, direct bank activities, and remove bank officers and directors—follows from the fact that banks are not purely private businesses but premodern independent agencies operated by private actors. This perspective renders legible many aspects of the statutory framework including the Insurance Fund and the Discount Window. These programs are best understood, not as special subsidies to business organizations, but as efforts to administer a bank-money system by explicitly backing bank money.

Although most of the legislators who designed our banking system subscribed to the outsourcing model, it is rarely mentioned in the contemporary literature.\footnote{See, e.g., Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 194 (1949) (defining the “supervising power” and comparing supervision of banks with FCC supervision of radio programs and SEC supervision of registration statements). Instead, scholars during this period justified banking law either by reference to its long history or the difficulty of addressing the consequences of bad banking through formal procedures. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 29, at 155–57. James Landis, for example, recognized the OCC’s unusual power but did not attempt to explain it—noting only that there is no judicial review if the agency decides to exercise its authority to publicize reports of bank condition even though the consequences for banks are “truly significant.” Landis, supra note 31, at 1084. Landis omitted the banking agencies from The Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve.} One exception is a short 1978 article by...
a lawyer in private practice who noted that banking is “an instrument of government, a means through which governmental policy is executed.”122 Another is Willard Hurst’s 1971 legal history of money, which described bank charters as “statutory franchises” that confer “special privileges to issue circulating currency and place[ ] [banks] under legal regulation of their finances unlike any imposed on the general run of business.”123 There is also the important recent work of Bob Hockett and Saule Omarova,124 Christine Desan,125 and Morgan Ricks,126 all of whom adopt a “money view” of the banking system. But none of this work connects bank supervision as a distinct mode of governance to the franchise nature of banking or reveals the role that the outsourcing model played in the genesis of banking law.127 It is to that task that this Article now turns.


125. Desan situates banks within a millennium of Anglo-American monetary history, delimiting their quasi-statal role, but does not extend the story to modern banking law and administration. See supra note 112.

126. Ricks describes banking as a public-private partnership but does not address supervision. RICKS, supra note 103, at 162–63, 204–05.

127. The only scholarship I am aware of that attempts this is nearly a century old. See ALLAN G. GRUCHY, SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF VIRGINIA STATE BANKS (1937) (examining state bank oversight and its methods); THOMAS KANE, THE ROMANCE AND TRAGEDY OF BANKING (1921) (recounting the history of the OCC). Classic banking treatises consider supervision but do not theorize it. See, e.g., JOHN T. HOLDSWORTH, MONEY AND BANKING 318–35 (6th ed. 1937) (describing supervision); KNIFFIN, supra note 54, at 349–70 (same).
II. BUILDING THE AMERICAN MONETARY SETTLEMENT

For most of American history, legislators, administrators, and judges understood bank supervision to be a distinct, necessary, and legitimate mode of governance. Underlying their understanding was a recognition that banks—because they create the money supply—are more like premodern independent agencies than private businesses. Discretionary oversight of banks by special government officials comprised a constant and critical element of what I call the AMS, an institutional arrangement that has endured for more than 150 years.

The AMS was substantially forged at three critical moments: 1838, 1863, and 1933. This Part revisits these moments in order to illuminate the intellectual, legal, and political conditions that made the AMS and supervision possible. Section II.A examines the emergence of the AMS in antebellum state law. In the 1830s and 1840s, New York paired open-access outsourcing with informal, strict oversight by special government officials. Section II.B explains how the New York model went national, as Congress copied it in 1863 and used it to design the OCC and the Fed. Section II.C follows the story from the New Deal to the present day, revealing how Congress created the FDIC and expanded the powers of all three banking agencies decade after decade so that the agencies could adjust bank activities without resorting to formal legal process. Time and again, Congress sustained and strengthened this mode of governance, aware of its unusual features and unphased by reform efforts designed to formalize other parts of the administrative state.

A. State Origins

The AMS emerged in response to the political and institutional failure of the first American monetary order. This order, which lasted from the founding to 1836, used parastatal banking corporations to expand the money supply and fuel economic growth. It was based off of a monetary settlement struck in Britain in the 1690s. That settlement had three main features: (1) outsourcing—the British government chartered the Bank of England to issue notes and deposits for use as money,128 pledging not to expand the money supply directly by

128. The idea of using a bank to create an elastic money supply dates to the seventeenth century. See William Petty, Quantulumcunque Concerning Money (1682), reprinted in The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty 446 (Charles Henry Hull ed., 1899) (“What remedy is there if we have too little Money? Answ. We must erect a Bank, which well computed, doth almost double the Effect of our coined Money.”). Petty, of course, refers to “a Bank” not to “banks.”
devaluing the metal content of its coins; separation—Parliament prohibited the Bank from engaging in commercial activities; and monopoly—Parliament pledged not to charter any other banks and forbid any other person from circulating paper money in London.

Drawing on these antecedents, Congress chartered the Bank of the United States (“BUS”) in 1791 and renewed its charter in 1816. The founding generation largely agreed that delegating the power to create money (mostly to wealthy merchants) would strengthen the new government and avoid overissue. But like the members of Parliament who created the Bank of England, early U.S. officials viewed money creation as a prerogative of government. Chartering the BUS thus

129. For centuries, devaluations served as the primary means of monetary policy. They were not always popular with financial and mercantile elites. Desan, supra note 112, at 120–21, 169.

130. Bank of England Act (1694) § 26 (providing that “to the Intent that their Majesties Subjects may not be oppressed by the said Corporation by their monopolizing or ingrossing any sort of Goods, Wares, or Merchandizes, . . . the said Corporation . . . shall not at any time . . . Deal or Trade . . . in the buying or selling of any Goods, Wares or Merchandizes whatsoever”).

131. CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISIS & SCARCE CREDIT 90–91 (2014). Calomiris and Haber describe this arrangement as the outcome of what they call “the Game of Bank Bargains,” id. at 85, “a political process . . . whose stakes are wealth and power,” id. at 13, in which a country’s political bodies and financial elites haggle over “[f]inancial [p]roperty [r]ights,” id. at 38. Calomiris and Haber adopt the licensing view of banking that this Article rejects.


The stamping of paper is an operation so much easier than the laying of taxes, that a government, in the practice of paper emissions, would rarely fail in any such emergency, to indulge itself too far in the employment of that resource, to avoid as much as possible, one less auspicious to present popularity;

133. During the colonial period, Massachusetts tried to open a mint, but Parliament viewed American coins as a usurpation of Parliament’s sovereign power and forbade them. See GLYN DAVIES, A HISTORY OF MONEY 461 (2002); RONNIE J. PHILLIPS, THE CHICAGO PLAN & NEW DEAL BANKING REFORM 9 (1995). As a result, the colonists experimented extensively with paper moneys. But Parliament did not like this either and, in 1751, it restricted New England’s ability to issue paper currency. In 1764, Parliament extended the restrictions to the other colonies. Id. at 10.

134. For example, Albert Gallatin, secretary of the Treasury from 1801 to 1814, explained that “[t]he right of issuing paper money as currency, like that of gold and silver coins, belongs exclusively to the nation.” STEPHEN W. NICKERSON, LAW OF MONEY 40 (1900). William Crawford, secretary of the Treasury from 1816 to 1825 and a skeptic of private banking, argued that “[c]oinage and the regulation of money have[,] in all nations[,] been considered the highest acts of sovereignty,” and therefore money “should not issue upon the credit of any individual or association of individuals.” Id. Daniel Webster argued that the statal nature of banking was settled at the founding and that it would be a mistake to allow the states to “delegate” the power to create money to dozens of banks. DANIEL WEBSTER, MR. WEBSTER’S SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, UPON THE QUESTION OF RENEWING THE CHARTER OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1832) (lamenting that, although “[i]t cannot well be questioned, that it was intended by the Constitution to submit the whole subject of the currency of the country . . . to the control . . . of Congress,” including the “exclusive power” to “decide how far any substitute should interfere with it, and what that
meant delegating state power to private actors and required some public control.\textsuperscript{135} In practice, public control derived from the government’s status as the Bank’s biggest customer and its ownership interest (the government was the Bank’s largest shareholder).\textsuperscript{136} The Bank’s charter was time limited. And the Treasury secretary had formal inspection rights.\textsuperscript{137} The Congress also had (and at one point exercised) the power to convene a special committee to investigate the Bank’s affairs. In 1816, when Congress rechartered the BUS, it gave the U.S. President the power to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, five of the Bank’s twenty-five directors.\textsuperscript{138}

States established analogues like the Bank of New York and the Massachusetts Bank.\textsuperscript{139} These banks were also parastatal monopolies, part-owned by the government,\textsuperscript{140} and their ability to expand the money supply was regulated (and limited) by the BUS, which could redeem their notes for specie to check overissue.\textsuperscript{141}

This regime, largely drawn up by the country’s first Treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton, was politically unstable from the start and ultimately collapsed. The first and most significant problem was that the shareholders and managers of the BUS (and its couple dozen state cousins) all came from the Federalist Party and formed a new aristocracy. As one critic complained, in chartering a single National Bank, Congress “lodged” extraordinary power “in the hands of less than fifty individuals, who [could] make the whole monied capital of the United States bow to them.”\textsuperscript{142} That these individuals belonged to a substitute should be,” the states have “taken possession of the power” and “delegated” it to dozens of state banks).

\textsuperscript{135} As Hamilton put it, an incorporated “bank is not a mere matter of private property, but a political machine of the greatest importance to the state.” Report, supra note 127, at 92. See also id. at 240 (“[p]ublic utility is more truly the object of public banks, than private profit”); Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 505, 508 (1815) (“The National Bank ought not to be regarded simply as a commercial bank . . . it is not an institution created for the purposes of commerce and profit alone, but much more for the purposes of national policy, as an auxiliary in the exercise of some of the highest powers of the Government.”).

\textsuperscript{136} HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 144–45, 167; HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA 84 (2003).


\textsuperscript{138} WHITE, supra note 48, at 460–75.

\textsuperscript{139} HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 164–66. Outside of London, Parliament similarly allowed “country banks” to issue notes.

\textsuperscript{140} South Carolina and Vermont established wholly government-owned banks: the Bank of the State of South Carolina and the Vermont State Bank. HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 166–68. Delaware set up the Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware, for which it was the primary stockholder. Id. at 167.

\textsuperscript{141} ROSS M. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION 19 (2d ed. 1995).

\textsuperscript{142} Hezekiah Niles, To Correct Abuses by the Bank, NILES’ WKL. REG., Mar. 7, 1818, at 17, 23. See also Joseph Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1054 (2001) (explaining that the problem with these banks was their “intermediate statal nexus”).
minority party during a period of Democratic-Republican ascendancy only deepened their opponents’ resentments.

The regime’s second problem was that the Democratic-Republicans channeled their frustration into chartering dozens of new banks at the state level to compete with the BUS, the Bank of New York, and their kin—something Hamilton never envisioned and strongly opposed. When the BUS tried to tame the growing mass of banks in the 1820s, the system was strained past its breaking point. State bankers retaliated by helping to elect Andrew Jackson, and over the course of his two terms, Jackson drove the BUS out of business and its executives out of power. A monetary collapse and economic depression followed.

These events set the stage for the emergence of the AMS. This Section examines the first step in that process—the creation of the New York model. The New York model prefigured the AMS forged thirty years later at the federal level, repurposing elements of the British system while diffusing and democratizing the power of banks. Instead of relying on a monopoly or an oligopoly—far more monetarily stable arrangements—New York allowed anyone to apply for a charter to run a bank, thus putting in place one critical element of the AMS: open access. And since New York’s legislators could no longer handpick their

143. After the Democratic-Republicans swept to power in 1800, they set up the “State Bank, Albany,” arguing that the Bank of Albany, chartered in 1792, was a Federalist outfit and that Albany “needed a Republican bank.” HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 158. Similarly, Pennsylvania chartered the Farmers and Mechanics Bank, requiring that “a majority of the bank’s directors be ‘farmers, mechanics, and manufacturers actually employed in their respective professions,’” i.e., that they be Republicans. Id. at 165. Rhode Island too set up a bank to serve “the agricultural and mechanical interest”—the Washington Bank in Westerly. And the State Bank of Boston, established in 1811 in Massachusetts, advertised itself as “cherishing Republican men and Republican measures against the wiles and machinations” of the Federalists. Id. at 147. Jefferson himself, once president—realizing that he could not eliminate Hamilton’s banks without sinking the American economy—wrote to his Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin, “I am decidedly in favor of making all the banks Republican by sharing deposits among them in proportion to the dispositions they show.” Id. at 146–47. Banking was “an integral part of the spoils of politics. Federalists would grant no charters to Republicans, or Republicans to Federalists.” HORACE WHITE, MONEY AND BANKING: ILLUSTRATED BY AMERICAN HISTORY 333–34 (1895). Thus, the number of banks in the country grew from twenty-nine in 1800 to ninety in 1811. HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 144–45.

144. When the rumors reached Hamilton of efforts to open a second bank in New York in 1791, he wrote to an executive at the Bank of New York:

I have learnt with infinite pain the circumstance of a new bank having started up in your city. Its effects cannot but be in every way pernicious. These extravagant sallies of speculation do injury to the government, and to the whole system of public credit, . . . three great banks in one city must raise such a mass of artificial credit as must endanger every one of them, and do harm in every view. I sincerely hope . . . the joint force of two solid institutions [the First Bank and the Bank of New York] will, without effort or violence remove, the excrescence which has just appeared and which I consider as a dangerous tumor in your political and commercial economy.

HENRY DOMETT, A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NEW YORK 42 (1884).
franchisees, they also began to develop another element: supervision. They allowed the government to influence bank note issuance, examine books and records, and revoke charters at any sign of trouble. And they decided to delegate this responsibility to independent technocrats. Supervision and the new monetary order were thus coeval.

1. New York’s Safety Fund Act

New York invented bank supervision between 1829 and 1851.\(^{145}\) The initial blueprint was the product of a compromise between legislators skeptical of paper currency and those loyal to banks eager to retain their charters. The skeptics had the upper hand. The charters of most of the banks in New York were due to expire, and there was limited political will to renew them absent a way to ensure the reliability of their issues. The bankers strongly objected to the medicine suggested by some: unlimited stockholder liability.\(^{146}\) In 1829, Martin Van Buren, an ally of President Jackson and the governor of New York, embraced a creative alternative. Instead of making bank stockholders responsible for their own bank’s liabilities, Van Buren proposed to make banks responsible for each other.\(^{147}\)

Van Buren’s proposal had two parts. First, all new banks would be required to contribute three percent of their capital to a “Safety Fund” to be maintained by the state and used to pay off the notes and deposits of banks that failed. Second, all new banks would be regularly inspected by three “bank commissioners”—one to be selected by the governor, a second by the banks in the southern part of the state, and a

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\(^{145}\) Leonard White attributes the “discovery” that something like supervisory power is necessary to control the corporate affairs of banks to Massachusetts in 1838, White, supra note 29, at 475, seemingly unaware that Massachusetts copied New York’s scheme, see infra note 182 (citing the example of New York). Other sources trace supervision back to Massachusetts in 1813. See Mitchener & Jaremski, supra note 54, at 823 (citing GRUCHY, supra note 127, at 15) (“In 1813, the governor set up a system of three bank commissioners to enforce charter regulations . . .”). But these sources mischaracterize Massachusetts law. In 1811, the Massachusetts legislature began to require that new banks over a certain size pay to have three “commissioners” specially appointed to certify their specie reserves before opening. See An Act of June 27, 1811, ch. 84, § 2, 1811 Mass. Acts 501, 501 (the State Bank); see also An Act of June 23, 1812, ch. 34, § 2, 1812 Mass. Acts 47, 47–48 (the Boston Bank); An Act of June 23, 1812, ch. 38, § 2, 1812 Mass. Acts 62, 62–63 (the Union Bank); An Act of June 16, 1813, ch. 46, § 2, 1813 Mass. Acts 270, 271–272 (the New England Bank); An Act of Feb. 18, 1814, ch. 134, § 2, 1814 Mass. Acts 363, 383–384 (the Manufacturers and Mechanics Bank); An Act of Feb. 10, 1818, ch. 92, § 2, 1818 Mass. Acts 489, 489–490 (the Suffolk Bank); An Act of Feb. 3, 1829, ch. 96, § 3, 1829 Mass. Acts 1, 3 (codifying the requirement for all new banks). These one-off commissioners had no other powers or functions. Id. I suspect the contrary view stems from a misreading of WHITE, supra note 143, at 317, which Gruchy cites and which refers to provisions in the Act to Incorporate the New England Bank, authorizing these special commissioners. Id.; GRUCHY, supra note 127, at 15, 15 n. 3.

\(^{146}\) See JOHN JAY KNOX, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 399 (1900).

third by the banks in the remaining, mostly rural, parts of the state.148 (In 1837, New York changed the law to make all three commissioners government appointees.149) Each bank commissioner would serve for two years unless sooner removed by the governor for misconduct or neglect of duty150 and each would be a “check upon the others.”151

These commissioners were the prototype for modern bank supervision. They were term-tenured officers of the state sworn to uphold its constitution. They were prohibited from having any personal interest in any bank.152 They were to visit each bank every four months and could “examine upon oath, all the officers, servants, [and] agents of [each bank], or any other person, in relation to the affairs and condition of [the bank].”153 Along with subpoena power, they had remedial authority. If the commissioners “ascertain[ed] from [their] inspection

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148. The New York Safety Fund Act, April 2, 1829, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 87, at 643, 645–46 (section 15 of the Safety Fund Act). Van Buren’s plan mimicked the administrative structure New York had designed to govern another infrastructure industry—turnpikes. Between 1797 and 1807, New York established county highway commissions to supervise “turnpike corporations” and their toll roads. RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–1855, at 39–42 (1982). The commissioners were independent technocrats, and the fight over their ample discretion ary power prefigures the administrative law critique of the banking agencies today. In 1806, New York authorized the commissioners to issue written orders to turnpike companies in certain circumstances. The turnpike corporations (and Chancellor James Kent) objected. Id. at 40–41. According to Kent, then a member of New York’s Council of Revisions, the measure would vest “an arbitrary power over the interest and property of individuals which is unknown to the Constitution.” Id. But the legislature passed the law over Kent’s objection. The state regarded turnpike corporations as franchisees, wielding the statal power of eminent domain, and Governor George Clinton argued “a summary mode ought . . . to be prescribed to exact a compliance from those companies with the intentions of government.” Id. at 40.


151. KNOX, supra note 146, at 404.

152. See id. at 405. While the Safety Fund bill created the first bank supervisors, state oversight of money-issuing franchises dates to at least the eighth century. See Desan, supra note 112, at 56 (explaining that eighth century Anglo-Saxon kings “supervised moneymen within their kingdom”). In the mid-twelfth century, Henry II adopted a system called “free minting,” in part because it allowed for fewer, more highly supervised mints. As Desan explains, although moneymen originally performed their own tests [on coins], the process was gradually improved and standardized . . . . [E]ach squire, anticipating that he might personally lose if the coin he brought in failed to meet the sterling standard would take ‘good care . . . that the moneymen placed under him [did] not exceed the limits of the appointed standard’ or stretch the bullion further by adding more alloy.

Id. at 75; see also MARTIN ALLEN, MINTS AND MONEY IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 164–69 (2012) (discussing the state’s efforts to ensure that privately operated mints complied with government standards); MAVIS MATE, MONETARY POLICY IN ENGLAND, 1272-1307, 41 BRIT. NUMISMATIC J. 34, 37 (1972) (same); THOMAS J. SARGENT & FRANCOIS R. VELDE, THE BIG PROBLEM OF SMALL CHANGE 48 (2002) (explaining that medieval “mints were contracted out to private entrepreneurs”).

and examination, or in any other manner, that any of [the] said corporations [were] insolvent, or [had] violated any of the provisions of their act or acts of incorporation, or of any other act binding on such corporations,” they could “immediately apply to the court of chancery . . . for an injunction.”

Van Buren defended the new law in monetary terms, in effect, as an outsourcing arrangement. The “chief duty” of the state, he told the legislature, “is to see that the farmer, when he exchanges his produce or estate—the mechanic his wares—the merchant his goods—and all other classes of the community their property or services for bank paper, may rest contented as to its value.” According to Van Buren, the law’s “system of supervision,” “if fairly carried into effect,” would do this: it would “preserve the fund, and [ ] give our paper currency the utmost credit and stability.”

Despite an aggressive campaign by Wall Street bankers to block the proposal, the bill became law on April 2, 1829.

2. New York’s Free Banking Act

A decade later, New York took another major step toward the modern practice of supervision when it adopted open access by passing a general incorporation statute for banking. The shift was the result of Jackson’s successful war on the BUS, whose charter expired in 1836. When the monetary system collapsed the following year, state banks suspended cash payments (i.e., they stopped redeeming their notes or

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154. Id. at 646 (section 18 of the Safety Fund Act).
156. Id. at 641–42.
157. Wall Street banks opposed the new law and “tried to force the hands of the state government by pretending to wind up their affairs.” FRITZ REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS 266 (2d ed. 1968). But the BUS stepped into the breach and expanded lending to New York merchants and country banks, foiling these efforts. Id.
159. Jackson’s war was due in part to lobbying from Wall Street banks eager to eliminate federal regulation of money issuance and to break Philadelphia’s grip on American finance. Philadelphia served as the headquarters for the BUS. And Wall Street banks had not forgotten Biddle’s 1829 intervention, which thwarted their efforts to block the Safety Fund Act. See supra note 157. Moreover, these banks could not benefit from the seven percent rate of interest permitted by that Act because the BUS’s New York City branch offered discounts at six percent interest. See JOHN THOM HOLDSWORTH & DAVIS R. DEWEY, THE SECOND UNITED STATES BANK 265, 269 (1910).
allowing withdrawals in gold and silver coins), and the country plunged into a deep depression.160

Although Jacksonian ideology had caused the collapse, most people did not see it that way. Aspiring bankers had an easy time convincing Americans, who were always in need of currency, that there were too few banks and that the existing banks exercised oppressive power.161 A breakaway sect of the Democratic Party called the Loco-

Focos argued that the severe credit scarcity was due to undemocratic and subversive bank “monopolies,” most of which were Safety Fund banks. The Loco-Focos demanded that the legislature stop granting special privileges to handpicked citizens and instead recognize the “natural” “rights of the people to compete with the incorporated banks in dealing in money and credit.”162

Many Democratic officials agreed with the Loco-Focos and thought that the answer to the contraction was more laissez-faire. State senator Samuel Young, for example, complained that the Safety Fund system had spawned “unmitigated inequity in the distribution of [bank] stock” and “demoraliz[ed] the public through the process of getting charters.”163 Young wanted “free banking”—free, meaning open access164—with no limit on the number or duration of bank charters and no involvement of the legislature in deciding whether to authorize a bank to open for business.165

In 1838, Governor William Marcy, seeking to avoid a schism within his party, pushed free banking into law, beginning a radical experiment in money creation.166 New York’s new system—often

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162. REDLICH, supra note 157, at 189.
163. Id. at 197. Even the bank commissioners agreed. See KNOX, supra note 146, at 405 (quoting the commissioners report, which stated that “[t]he distribution of bank stocks created at the last session” has prompted “violent contention and bitter personal animosities, corrupting to the public mind and destructive of the peace and harmony of society”).
164. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 141, at 23 (“To the people of the time the adjective ‘free’ meant that any individual or group of individuals, upon compliance with certain procedural steps in the statute, could start a bank.”). “Free banking” is often misinterpreted today to mean “subject to minimum regulations.” See, e.g., White, supra note 70, at 19.
165. New York first used free incorporation to address concerns about the legislature’s role in dispensing privileges in 1784 when it began to administratively charter religious institutions. See SEAVOY, supra note 148, at 9–10. (Pennsylvania did this first in 1791. Id. at 32 n.2.) One of the earliest advocates of free banking was the Columbia professor of political economy John McVickar, who proposed it in 1827. See JOHN McVICKAR, HINTS ON BANKING: IN A LETTER TO A GENTLEMAN IN ALBANY; BY A NEW YORKER (1827) (critiquing bank incorporation by the legislature as corrupt, self-dealing, and self-defeating).
166. HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 583. See REDLICH, supra note 157, at 196 (explaining that “but for the crisis of 1837 and the collapse of American banking which followed in its wake,” free banking would never have happened). Although, during the early 1830s, Jackson expressed
mistaken today for a deregulatory scheme—was anything but and represented the unique compromise at the heart of the AMS. It opened the business of banking to “full and free competition, under such general restrictions and regulations as are necessary to [e]nsure to the public a large and sound currency.” At the same time as New York ensured delegation and open access, it also imposed separation and supervision.

Indeed, “free banking” as pioneered by New York, and copied by many other states, was a regulatory measure. New York’s law required that all banks back their notes with government bonds and that they deposit these bonds with the state comptroller. In the event that a bank failed to redeem its notes, the law authorized the state comptroller to sell the bonds, redeem the notes, and close the bank. The law prohibited banks from commencing business without paid-in capital of $100,000 (a substantial sum), and all banks were required to keep a specie reserve of 12.5 percent of the value of their outstanding

interest in replacing the BUS with a Treasury-run institution, there was not much support for this idea in either party. supra note 103, at 360–61 (explaining that Jackson, for a time, envisioned a national bank with a branch in each state subject to the supervision of the Treasury and quoting Jackson as preferring an “entirely national” bank); see also Message by President Andrew Jackson Vetoing the Bank Recharter, July 10, 1832, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 87, at 816, 827 (arguing that Congress has exercised its power to coin money by establishing mints and “if they have other power to regulate the currency [i.e. through issuing bank money], it was conferred to be exercised by themselves, and not to be transferred to a corporation”); id. at 817 (“Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the public . . . .”). Those who had championed the BUS were suspicious of a wholly government-owned bank, which they feared the government would use to avoid levying taxes. See, e.g., supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also Briscoe v. President & Dirs. of Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. 257, 329–50 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting).

167. RDLICH, supra note 157, at 190 (quoting Marcy). As Hurst explains, “the implicit policy which emerged was one favoring delegation of money functions to private management, out of belief that liberal delegation would best muster the energy and resources to spur the economy.” HURST, supra note 106, at 154. Gulian Verplanck, a state senator sitting on the Court of Errors, the highest court in New York at the time, put it this way:

Strong public opinion and the requirements of trade were thought, by a large majority of the [l]egislature . . . to demand some legislation whereby the business of banking could be thrown open, under proper restraints, to all who might choose to engage in it, and this without dependence upon political patronage.


168. Drawing from New York’s draft legislative text, Michigan passed a similar law in 1837. See HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 572, 582. As the Supreme Court of Michigan explained in 1844, a general incorporation act for banks was “unknown in the history of legislation, either in this state or any other state or country.” Green v. Graves, 1 Doug. 351, 355 (Mich. 1844).

169. The New York Free Banking Acts of April 18, 1838 and May 14, 1840, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 87, at 1183–91. Under certain conditions, some mortgages on New York land might also be pledged. Id. at 1185 (sections 7 and 8 of the Act of April 18, 1838).

170. Id. at 1184, 1187, 1190 (sections 4, 12, and 27 the Act of April 18, 1838).

171. Id. at 1186 (section 15 of the Act of April 18, 1838).
notes. Importantly, the law authorized any bank creditor or shareholder with at least $1,000 on the line to appeal to the chancellor to conduct “a strict examination . . . of all the affairs” of the bank “for the purpose of ascertaining the safety of its investments, and the prudence of its management.” And all banks were required to publish financial statements.

As soon as the law took effect, the need for stronger, full-time discretionary oversight became evident. In 1840, New York amended the law to require anyone “carrying on banking business,” including the “free” banks, to be “subject to the inspection and supervision of the bank commissioners.” In 1843, due in part to concerns about the impartiality of the commissioners, New York transferred responsibility for bank oversight to the state comptroller, elected every three years by the legislature. New York also stripped banks of their power to print their own notes, shifting that responsibility to the comptroller who would register and issue notes only on receipt of the required securities.

Those involved in developing the New York model, as well as those legislators in other states who copied and refined it, understood the originality of their project and the key role discretionary administrative oversight played in rendering open-access

172. Id. § 33.
173. Id. § 25. The chancellor, however, could not take any direct action and could only publish a report along with his opinion. Id.
174. Id. § 26.
175. 1 William Graham Sumner, A History of Banking in All the Leading Nations; Comprising the United States; Great Britain; Germany; Austro-Hungary; France; Italy; Belgium; Spain; Switzerland; Portugal; Roumania; Russia; Holland; The Scandinavian Natives; Canada; China; Japan (1896). For example, new banks were abusing their franchise by avoiding redeeming their notes in specie on demand.
176. Act of May 14, 1840, ch. 363, § 11, reprinted in The Banking System of the State of New York, supra note 158, at 122. New York’s legislature is already distinguishing at this early date between the power of examination and the activity of supervision—the informal control exercised by examiners over a bank’s affairs.
177. Knox, supra note 146, at 403 (quoting one New York legislator explaining that the commissioners “were placed there like cur dogs to watch a meat market, and were as easily subsidized by suitable food”).
179. This appears to have been done in part to assuage the banks who disliked the commissioners and their broad investigatory powers and in part because, as Millard Fillmore explained, the reforms of 1837 had “brought [the commissioners] within the vortex of the great political whirlpool of the State; and the place was sought for and conferred upon [party] aspirants, without due regard in all cases to their qualifications to discharge the delicate trust committed to them.” See State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., Annual Report of the Comptroller (Jan. 4, 1849), in 1 Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York no. 5, at 51 (1849). In 1846, New York adopted a new constitution, which subjected the comptroller’s office to popular election biannually. N.Y. Const. of 1846, art. V, § 1.
180. See Knox, supra note 146, at 419.
WHY SUPERVISE BANKS?

For example, in 1837, one Massachusetts state senator noted that the bank commissions recently established in New York, Vermont, and Maine exercised a salutary informal power over banks—precisely the sort of supervisory power under attack today. As he put it: banks are incentivized “to meet the approbation of the government’s officers,” and accordingly, commissioners “exert a controlling influence over the banks’ issues, discounts, exchanges, deposits[,] in short, over all their operations.” As a result, commissioners “contribute, essentially, to the stability and usefulness of these institutions, by producing a uniformity in their operations, and by sustaining, towards them, the confidence of the public.”

To bolster this “controlling influence,” and prevent bank failures, the states continued to expand discretionary authority in the decade that followed. Most notably, in 1847, New York’s legislature introduced the concepts of safety and soundness into law, mimicking

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181. As A. C. Flagg, New York’s comptroller from 1833 to 1839 and 1842 to 1847, explained: After repudiating the British form of government, we adopted her paper system, in a form much more loose and insecure to the people, than was ever tolerated even in England. … The acknowledgement of the necessity of [strict] restrictions in England, … in creating debt and paper money, ought to admonish us of the necessity of new safe-guards; … it is of the highest importance that … New York, should give the full force of its example, to the establishment of a sound currency, … and the sacred preservation of the public faith.


182. Debate in the Massachusetts Legislature: Remarks of Mr. Lawrence, of Hampshire, on the Bill for the Appointment of Bank Commissioners, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 23, 1837.

183. Id. Senator Lawrence continued: “[C]ommissioners, armed with authority to enter any bank, on any day, and any hour of the day, and with ample powers, to ferret out mischiefs, if any exist … would exert a most salutary restraint on their managers … It would abolish all discordant customs among the banks, and introduce a uniform system of usages and modes.” Id.

184. For example, by 1847, of the 117 free banks incorporated in New York, forty-three had already been closed, thirty of these by the comptroller. State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., Annual Report of the Comptroller (Jan. 6, 1847), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK no. 5, at 54 (1847).

185. New York’s supervisors sought enhanced authority as early as 1842. Annual Report of the Bank Commissioners, in 2 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK no. 29, at 22 (1842). The commissioners also complained about window dressing and proposed the first “call reports.” Id. at 20.


Whenever in the opinion of the comptroller,” New York provided, “there [is] good cause to suspect that any bank … has made an incorrect or imperfect quarterly return, or is in an unsound or unsafe condition to do banking business, it shall be his duty to have … such bank … examined [and] … report … the result of such examination.

The 1847 statute, in its choice of words, resembles the text of an 1846 Ohio law expanding the oversight powers of the Board of Control of Ohio’s bank branching system. See Act of Jan. 6, 1846,
similar statutes already enacted in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut. Massachusetts law, for example, required state judges to issue injunctions even before holding "a hearing of evidence to satisfy [their] own mind" merely "on the complaint of the bank commissioners" that a bank's "condition is such as to render its further progress hazardous to the public." New York subsequently gave its officials a similar power to proceed against banks when, in their opinion, banks were in an "unsound or unsafe condition."

Officials once again explained the need for strict oversight in outsourcing terms:

When the State assumes to authorize a person, or associations of persons, to stamp paper dollars, and literally force them into the hands of the citizen, in exchange for his labor and his property, it is an incumbent duty to compel the manufacturer of the currency to secure such citizen[ ] against loss . . . .

§ 2, in 2 THE VERIFIED REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF OHIO: INCLUDING ALL LAWS OF A GENERAL NATURE IN FORCE JAN. 1ST, 1890, at 2299.

The existing literature tracks safety and soundness law to 1933. See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 73, at 188 ("Principles of safety and soundness have been a source of directors' duties since as early as 1833 when Congress authorized removal proceedings against national bank directors for unsafe or unsound banking practices."); Dalvinder Singh, Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets 70 (2007) ("Safety and soundness . . . was first incorporated in US bank regulation with the enactment of the Banking Act 1933 . . . "); Thomas L. Holzman, Unsafe or Unsound Practices: Is the Current Judicial Interpretation of the Term Unsafe or Unsound?, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 425, 428 (2000) (noting that its "origin presents somewhat of a mystery as does the lack of debate surrounding its adoption" in 1933). I examine the evolution of this standard in separate work focused on resurrecting the lost history of state banking law. See Lev Menand, The Monetary Basis of Bank Supervision (unpublished manuscript).

187. Each state used slightly different language. Compare An Act Concerning Banks, § 14, in PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 94 (1839) ("Whenever in the opinion of the bank commissioners the charter of any bank shall be forfeited [i.e. the bank shall have violated the provisions of the Act], or the public are in danger of being defrauded thereby . . . ."), with Act of July 4, 1837, ch. 140, § 27, in REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 266 (1843) ("If such commissioners, upon an examination into the affairs of any bank or for other good cause, shall deem it unsafe for the public interest . . . ."), and Act of Feb. 23, 1838, ch. 14, § 5, in SUPPLEMENTS TO THE REVISED STATUTES: GENERAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 60 (1849):

If upon examination of any bank . . . said commissioners shall be of [the] opinion that the same is insolvent, or that its condition is such as to render its further progress hazardous to the public, or to those having funds in its custody, and also that said bank . . . has exceeded its powers, or has failed to comply with all of the rules, restrictions and conditions provided by law . . . .

188. Commonwealth by Bank Comm'r v. President of Farmers & Mechs. Bank, 38 Mass. 542, 549 (1839). In 1838, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in what it described as a "very important case," upheld the power, explaining that its "object was to prevent [banks] becoming dangerous to the public by their mismanagement and breach of the laws," and that it was a proper exercise of legislative authority, especially "[w]hen it is considered how important it is to all the great interests of the community, that banks should be managed uprightly and with integrity . . . and how important it is that they should enjoy the confidence of the community . . . ."

Id. at 549–51.

189. See infra note 196.

According A.C. Flagg, New York’s comptroller, “the holder [of New York bank paper] ought to feel as safe, so far as the action of the government is concerned, as he does with coin stamped at the mint.” In 1849, the future President Millard Fillmore, who succeeded Flagg as comptroller, explained that “[t]o furnish this currency, so far as it consists of paper or credit, is an exclusive privilege granted by the State, and the State should take care that in granting it the people are secured from imposition and loss.” For the founders of the AMS, then, money creation was a sovereign prerogative, and it followed that delegating this power to private actors required close public control.

In 1851, New York extended public control over banks even further by transferring supervision to a full-time independent agency, the New York Banking Department, a clear precursor to today’s banking agencies and the first such banking body in the United States. This was supervision in a modern key, as the state fully embraced its oversight role. New York charged the superintendent of the department with ensuring that the state’s monetary system functioned properly and that credits issued by the state’s banks maintained a stable value in gold and silver coins. In 1854, it empowered the superintendent to “refuse to issue or deliver any registered notes to” a bank in “an unsound or unsafe condition,” “until such time as he shall be satisfied that such bank . . . is in a sound and safe condition to do [ ] banking business.” This provision allowed the superintendent to suspend a bank’s business not just when the bank violated a rule but whenever the superintendent thought the bank was being mismanaged. In the subsequent decades, the department was repeatedly strengthened, gaining the authority to institute

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194. The Banking Department had a precursor in a powerful independent agency New York created in 1784 to oversee its education system: the Regents of the University of the State of New York. New York empowered the Regents to charter, examine, and supervise schools. See SEAVOY, supra note 165, at 13–15; Revised Statutes of the State of N.Y., Part I, Chap. XV, Title 1, Art. 1 (1829) (providing the organizational structure and powers of the Board of Regents).
195. Act of Apr. 15, 1854, ch. 242, § 3, 1854 N.Y. Laws 551, reprinted in THE BANKING SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 158, at 200–02 (emphasis added). Section 3 also provided that the superintendent could restrict note issue if he determined that the business of the bank was “not transacted in the manner prescribed by law.” Id.
196. In 1882, New York authorized the bank superintendent, in conjunction with the state attorney-general, to institute insolvency proceedings whenever a bank “has committed a violation of its charter or of law” or “is conducting business in an unsafe or unauthorized manner.” Act of July 1, 1882, ch. 409, § 223, reprinted in BANKING LAWS: AN ACT TO REVISE THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK RELATING TO BANKS, BANKING AND TRUST COMPANIES 86 (2012). In 1892, New York amended the law to provide that the superintendent may “take possession” of a bank if he
insolvency proceedings against banks and “take possession” of “unsound” banks outright.197

B. Lincoln and Wilson’s Federal Transformation

Three decades after the collapse of the BUS, the federal government began to create the institutional framework that would comprise the modern AMS. In doing so, it drew heavily on the New York Model. First, in 1863, Congress created the OCC to charter and oversee hundreds of national banks to serve collectively as a sort of third Bank of the United States. Then, in 1913, it created the Fed to coordinate the monetary activities of national banks and extend federal supervision to a growing mass of banks chartered by state governments. Both agencies manage our open-access monetary system by ensuring that the private managers and shareholders of banks create sound money.

1. The National Bank Act

After the demise of the Second Bank in 1834, it took thirty years and a war to build our modern monetary order. By 1862, there were approximately 1,500 state banks, creating most of the money supply by lending to business firms. These banks were primarily concentrated in

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197. The term “sound” was an adjective commonly used to describe monetary instruments—notes and deposits—that could be converted into base money (then gold and silver coins) on demand at par. In forthcoming work, I argue that the first use of the term in this sense was probably in the 1810 Report of the Bullion Committee, an assessment by the British Parliament of whether the Bank of England’s 1797 suspension of cash payments (i.e., its refusal to redeem its notes and deposits in gold and silver coin) had triggered inflation. House of Commons, Report from the Select Comm. on the High Price of Bullion (1810), reprinted in 2 The Revised Statutes of the State of New York 1038 (1896) (emphasis added).

In 1840, Maryland, in its annual report to Congress on its banking system, proclaimed that “[t]he end of the design for which the [state’s] banks were created was to secure a sound and redeemable paper currency—a paper currency at all times payable on demand in specie.” H.R. Doc. No. 26–172, at 378 (1840). At the end of the century, A. Barton Hepburn, a bank supervisor, gave this same definition: “[s]ound money as applied to paper or token money of any kind means that which is redeemable in money wherein the commercial value of its bullion equals its coinage value.” Hepburn, supra, at 30–31. So, when New York empowered supervisors to ensure that banks were “sound” they were referring to, as A.C. Flagg put it, “efforts to make the paper issues of [banks] equivalent to gold and silver, or as nearly so as practicable . . . .” State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., supra note 181, at 72.
the seventeen states that had enacted free banking laws modeled on New York’s. A handful of states employed a publicly controlled “branching system,” with a government-run Board of Directors supervising privately capitalized branches. The remaining states prohibited banking entirely or still operated parastatal oligopolies on the Hamiltonian model.

For states like New York and Massachusetts, with appropriate restrictions and strong supervision, the system worked tolerably well. And, although trade both within and between states was somewhat impaired by the variegated money supply (households and businesses spent and received thousands of different paper notes), private solutions facilitated commerce.

But as with so many aspects of the American state, the monetary system could not meet the demands of the Civil War. Military necessity compelled Congress to appropriate more and more money, and the Treasury found that it did not have enough tax receipts to cover its expenditures. First, Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase turned to borrowing, draining gold and silver bullion out of the state banks. In December 1861, when rumors spread that Britain might enter the war, panic hit. With much of the country’s gold sitting in Treasury warehouses, banks were unable to make good on their obligations. Banks in nearly every state suspended payments on their notes and deposit accounts.

198. See Robertson, supra note 141, at 16. Rhode Island, an exception with eighty-eight banks by 1863, adopted a robust supervisory scheme. See Knox, supra note 146, at 373 (noting the statutory and supervisory limits placed on banks); An Act in Relation to Banks, § 7, in Public Laws of the State of Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations as Revised by a Committee and Finally Enacted by the General Assembly at the Session in January, 1844, at 290 (1852) (providing that the bank commissioner might enjoin any bank if “in his opinion . . . [that] bank has forfeited its charter at law, or is so managing its concerns that the public are in danger of being defrauded thereby”).

199. Indiana pioneered this approach in 1834. After Ohio and Iowa followed suit, in 1845 and 1858 respectively, see Knox, supra note 146, at 679–80, 766–67. Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Delaware, and Vermont adopted the same type of system, see Robertson, supra note 141, at 28.

200. Id. at 23. Nine states outlawed banking in the 1840s and 1850s. South Carolina, Missouri, and Ohio maintained restricted systems and partial state ownership until the Civil War. See id.

201. See L. Carroll Root, New England Bank Currency, 2 Sound Currency, June 1, 1885, at 6–8 (noting that only three banks failed in Massachusetts between 1840 and 1865); L. Carroll Root, New York Bank Currency, 2 Sound Currency, Feb. 1, 1895, at 24 (noting the exceptional strength of New York’s paper currency).

202. See, e.g., J. Thompson, Thompson’s Bank Note and Commercial Reporter, Nov. 5, 1853 (assessing the relative value of various bank notes).


205. Id. at 322–24. Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky—the exceptions—all had government-run state banking systems with private branches. Id. at 324.
With neither banks nor the Treasury redeeming the country’s paper money in coin, the Lincoln Administration prevailed on Congress to roll back delegation by passing the Legal Tender Act. The Act was a break with seventy-five years of practice. It authorized the government to issue its own paper notes called “greenbacks,” expanding the money supply directly rather than through privately operated banks. But as the state banks started using greenbacks as reserves on which to issue even more of their own notes, the value of the dollar began to drop.

The Administration feared direct monetary expansion by the government combined with state banking would end in disaster. The natural solution—rechartering the BUS to replace greenbacks and restrict state bank issues—was politically toxic. Instead, the Administration proposed to federalize the New York Model. It argued that the United States should charter national banks, plural, which would issue a “uniform currency” in exchange for U.S. bonds. Congress would not pick winners, nor would it limit the power to monetize debt and allocate credit to just a few hands. Anyone with enough capital, willing to abide by the rules and to subject their operations to state oversight, would be free to supply a part of the nation’s money. With the help of John Sherman, the powerful senator from Ohio, Lincoln secured passage of the National Bank Act (“NBA”) on February 20, 1863. He signed it five days later.

The Act was a compromise. Farmers and workers, especially in the West and the South, opposed private banking and celebrated Lincoln’s greenbacks. They wanted to see public control over the money supply, with money issued by the people’s political representatives. Banking delegated this public power to private actors and, in their eyes, concentrated wealth for the benefit of special interests. The NBA was,

206. If notes were not convertible into gold and silver on demand, most policymakers thought people would lose confidence in their value, triggering inflation. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 842 (1863) (Statement of Sen. John Sherman).
207. See, e.g., KANE, supra note 127, at 23–24.
208. A revised version of the Act was passed in 1864, which is the version discussed herein. See The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 87, at 1383, 1383–1411.
from this perspective, a conservative measure.\textsuperscript{212}

At the same time, the NBA was also a radical act of creation: It federalized state money issuance and regulated it in order to make it politically palatable. It established the OCC as a bureau within the Treasury Department and empowered it to charter and supervise a new system of “national banks.” These banks were not designed to facilitate private wealth creation, but to serve as premodern independent agencies. As Representative Samuel Hooper, the law’s primary drafter, put it: “It will be as if the Bank of the United States had been divided into many parts, and each part endowed with the life, motion, and similitude of the whole . . . .”\textsuperscript{213} Like the BUS, each new national bank would be owned and operated by private interests to prevent monetary overissue\textsuperscript{214} and politicized asset allocation.\textsuperscript{215} As Senator Sumner put it: “[The national banking system] is an instrument in the public service . . . . Is it not an instrument? Is it not as much an instrument as your navy yard, your arsenal, or your mint?”\textsuperscript{216} National banks are “essential instruments” of the government, another member declared.\textsuperscript{217} The public status of national banks is reflected in the law

\textbf{212. Id. at 78.}

A circulation issued directly by the Government cannot be made a good currency. The difficulty is partly in the nature of the thing and partly in the nature of men. The total difficulty is insurmountable & so says all experience. The only remaining way which has had trial enough to warrant reasonable expectation of success is through banking Institutions. Local Banks were tried in the war of 1812 & failed disastrously . . . . The Bank of the United States has been twice tried & nobody is bold enough to propose a third trial. There seems to remain only a National Free Banking System. A state Free Banking System has been tried in New York for three million[ ] . . . . people with the best results on State credit and individual well being;


The only answer [to the question “why look at all to the interests of the banks; why not directly issue the notes of the Government”] is that history teaches us that the public faith of a nation alone is not sufficient to maintain a paper currency. There must be a combination between the interests of private individuals and the Government;

\textbf{John Sherman, The National Banking Project; The Certainty with Which It Will Give Us a Sound National Currency, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1863, at 4 (“The well-guarded Free Banking system proposed by Mr. C[hase], commends itself in that it promises the needed currency. The central idea of that measure is the establishment of one sound, uniform circulation, of equal value throughout the country, upon the foundation of National credit, combined with private capital.”).}

\textbf{215. U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Rep. On the State of the Finances for the Year Ending June 30, 1962, Referred to the H. Comm. on Fin., 37th Cong., 16-17 (3d Sess. 1862) (explaining that when the federal fiscal stance returned to a “healthy normal” it would be impossible for the federal government, by spending money, to provide greenbacks “in sufficient amounts for the wants of the people,” forcing the government to lend notes into circulation, which “would convert the treasury into a government bank, with all its hazards and mischiefs”).}

itself, which recaptured profits generated by money issuance by collecting royalties\textsuperscript{218} and refers to each bank as a “franchise.”\textsuperscript{219}

National banks were given standardized names (reflecting their status as government instrumentalities). Thus, the first bank to secure a charter in Baltimore was the First National Bank of Baltimore and the fourth bank to secure a charter in New York was the Fourth National Bank of New York.\textsuperscript{220} And the NBA required national banks to deposit United States bonds with the comptroller and authorized the comptroller to issue notes to each bank in an amount equivalent to ninety percent of the value of the deposited bonds.\textsuperscript{221} The NBA required national banks to maintain specie reserves equal to between fifteen and twenty-five percent of their monetary liabilities.\textsuperscript{222} And it imposed supervision, copying key elements of New York’s law. Specifically, the Act empowered the comptroller to “thorough[ly]” inspect national banks “as often as shall be deemed necessary or proper” to depose the officers and agents of the bank under oath and to publish a full and detailed report.\textsuperscript{223} If the examiners identified legal violations,\textsuperscript{224} or if a bank refused to redeem its circulating notes in gold and silver coin,\textsuperscript{225} the comptroller could bring suit against the bank and seek to dissolve it. The Act also delegated a series of plenary approval powers to the comptroller,\textsuperscript{226} which meant banks often needed government cooperation to operate effectively.\textsuperscript{227}

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\item\textsuperscript{218} Salmon P. Chase, Letter to John Bigelow (Oct. 7, 1862), in 3 The Papers of Salmon P. Chase 299, 293 (1996); Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1146–47 (1863) (statement of Rep. John B. Alley) (arguing that “the people are entitled” to the profit from money creation, and “the government is really the party who should have all the profit of the circulation” and is “entitled to the whole benefit”).
\item\textsuperscript{219} The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States, supra note 87, at 1383, 1385 (“Such association shall have power to adopt a corporate seal, and shall have succession by the name designated in its organization certificate . . . unless the franchise shall be forfeited by a violation of this act . . . .”) (emphasis added); 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Second) (noting that the “franchise becomes forfeited by reason of violation of law”). See also Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1412 (1864) (statement of Rep. John Pruyn) (noting that national banks operate under a “franchise granted by the Government”); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2204 (1864) (statement of Sen. Edgar Cowan) (noting that national banks possess a “franchise” granted by the federal government).
\item\textsuperscript{220} See Robertson, supra note 141, at 49.
\item\textsuperscript{221} The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States, supra note 87, at 1391–92 (sections nineteen and twenty-one).
\item\textsuperscript{222} Id. §§ 31, 32.
\item\textsuperscript{223} Id. § 54.
\item\textsuperscript{224} Id. § 53.
\item\textsuperscript{225} Id. §§ 32, 46-50.
\item\textsuperscript{226} For example, comptroller approval was required before a bank could reduce (or increase) its equity capital. Id. § 13.
\item\textsuperscript{227} For example, here is how Senator Steele of New York described the supervisory authority embedded in the original NBA—modest by comparison to many of the states at the time: “[These banks] will be entirely at the mercy of the Treasury Department, and therefore to that extent
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Secretary Chase imagined that the new banks would completely replace the existing state banks, forcing those banks to convert to national charters or disband. In 1865, Congress imposed a prohibitive ten percent tax on state bank notes, and by 1868, the number of state banks had fallen to less than 250 (an eighty-five percent reduction). “The banks created by the national banking act,” the Department of Justice explained fifty years later, “were, and were designed to be, local institutions and independent of each other, but under national control and supervision. Nationalization without centralization was the keynote of the law.” The plan was “so radical in its character and so destructive to the existing system of state banks,” one of its supporters explained, that it was explicable only as an incident of war.

While the creation of the OCC marked the birth of modern banking law, the Act did not give the comptroller all its modern powers. Like in New York, these would come in time. Formally, for many decades, the comptroller could act only when examiners identified violations of the Act’s bright-line rules. In practice, however, and as many opponents of the NBA anticipated prior to its enactment, the comptroller exercised substantial informal discretionary authority, more than was common in most states. Supervisory letters, precursors to today’s MRAs, were routine. Minor rule violations were widespread, and bankers who violated the Act faced severe sanctions; bank directors faced personal liability, and bank employees faced criminal sanctions. Rule violations were also grounds for examiners to revoke a bank’s charter. Accordingly, the comptroller used them as

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228. HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 725, 728.
229. ROBERTSON, supra note 141, at 53.
231. HAMMOND, supra note 103, at 725 (quoting Senator Sherman).
232. Indeed, as at other points in U.S. history, supervision was fiercely contested: bankers and others fought, usually unsuccessfully, to limit government oversight. See, e.g., supra note 227.
233. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1433 (1864) (statement of Rep. William Steele) (“Under this power of examination any one of these institutions that happens to incur the displeasure of the Department can be broken down [through repeated, onerous, and costly examinations].”).
234. KANE, supra at note 127, at 465 (“Here comes the man who writes those letters to the banks telling them how they should conduct their business.”).
235. According to one longtime official, “[P]robably seventy-five per cent[ ] of the examiners’ reports, and about the same percentage of reports of condition made by the banks, disclosed violations of law of one kind or another . . . .” KANE, supra at note 127, at 366.
236. The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 87, at 1407 (section fifty-three, directors); id. at 1407–08 (section fifty-five, employees).
leverage.\footnote{Kane, supra note 127, at 366.} "Strictly speaking," an official OCC history explained, "the Comptroller had to rely on cooperation from officers and directors of banks in order to correct [unsafe practices]. Nevertheless, the growing prestige of the Office and the weight of authority that grew with it, plus the latent threat of charter revocation, soon gave the Comptroller . . . adequate coercive power."\footnote{Robertson, supra note 141, at 71 n.13.}

The comptroller’s monetary outsourcing function was obvious to both advocates and opponents of the new system.\footnote{See Robert Hockett, Money’s Past Is Fintech’s Future: Wildcat Crypto, the Digital Dollar, and Citizen Central Banking, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 221, 226 (2019) (arguing that “‘comptroller’ is merely archaic English for ‘controller’ ” and that the “OCC, housed in Treasury, was effectively [established to serve as] the ‘controller’—the administrator—of our national currency system”).} Indeed, Senator Sherman justified the Act, and its preemption of state banking, by reference to the Constitution’s monetary clauses. “No state,” Sherman explained, “has the power to interfere with this exclusive authority in Congress to regulate the national currency.”\footnote{Hammond, supra note 103, at 726.} “If you give to an individual or a corporation[, as the states had,] the power to issue . . . note[s] as money at a time when he is not restrained by the necessity of paying in gold and silver,” Sherman argued, “you give him practically the power to coin money.” Thus, “[w]hen ever specie payments are suspended,” as they were during the War, “the power to issue a bank note is the same as the power to coin money.”\footnote{Speech by John Sherman [Ohio] on the National Banking Bill, February 10, 1863, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 87, at 1355, 1360.} This is a privilege, Sherman continued, “that no nation can safely surrender to individuals or banks.”\footnote{Id. at 1361.} On Sherman’s view, the NBA recaptured control over this privilege and franchised it out to new nationally chartered entities because “history teaches us that the public faith of a nation alone is not sufficient to maintain a paper currency.”\footnote{Id. at 1362.} Rather than rely on Treasury notes, Sherman concluded, Congress might instead “combin[e] . . . the interests of private individuals and the Government” by establishing national banks and putting them under the supervision of special government officials.\footnote{Id.}

The comptroller’s office shared Sherman’s view—supervision was entailed by the outsourcing model. As Comptroller A. Barton Hepburn explained in his annual report to Congress in 1892: “[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to provide and regulate a circulating
medium for the people, [and accordingly,] the Government examines and supervises [national] banks to see that all laws in respect to circulation are fully complied with.”

And as banks “are so intimately connected with business transactions and their soundness so essential to business prosperity . . . governmental control has gone one step further and seeks to protect the public against loss—to protect a bank’s creditors.” According to Hepburn, while “[t]he affirmative action of the banks in their competition for business is left to the enterprise of their managers, prompted by the desires of shareholders for dividends,” it is “[t]he function of the Government . . . to restrain, [and] to [e]nsure good banking, by enforcing the prohibitions against unsafe practices, which the law provides.”

2. The Federal Reserve Act

There were two flaws in the national banking system. First, neither the comptroller nor the Congress had the ability to actively coordinate national bank money issuance, a problem that was particularly acute during periods of stress. Second, the rise of checking accounts led to a resurgence of state banks, and state banks were not subject to federal oversight. Although the Lincoln Administration had intended to drive the states entirely out of the money business, they overlooked the fact that deposit accounts, and checks drawn on them, could substitute for notes. In the late 1880s and 1890s the number of state banks grew once again as an increasing portion of commerce was transacted using deposits, often without recourse to physical media of payment. The Panic of 1907—which featured runs on this account money—brought the point home. In its wake, Congress established a National Monetary Commission to figure out what had gone wrong and to come up with a solution. The commission concluded, among other things, that notes were now a small part of the money supply and that what had become the larger part—deposit accounts—was not sufficiently regulated. These officials recognized that for a supervisory scheme to work it had to be tailored to the dominant form of money in circulation; in this case, it had to superintend deposit expansion by state chartered entities.

In 1913, to extend federal control to deposits, especially at the state level, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act—an “Act To

245. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT, 52d Cong., 2d Sess., at 40 (Dec. 5, 1892) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT (1892)].
246. Id.
247. Id.
provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an
elastic currency, to afford means of rediscourting commercial paper,
and to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United
States”—reasserting once again the federal government’s power over
the nation’s monetary architecture.249 The Act established the Federal
Reserve System, a “central” bank composed of a government Board in
Washington and regional Federal Reserve Banks (“FRBs”) situated in
twelve “districts.” Oversight of the FRBs was split between the Board
and state and national banks in each district. These “member banks”—
the national banks plus those state banks opting to join the System—
would appoint six of the nine directors of each FRB. The FRBs would
issue a new paper money—Federal Reserve Notes—which would be
“obligations of the United States . . . receivable by all national and
member banks and Federal reserve banks for all taxes, customs, and
other public dues.”250 The FRBs would also coordinate the clearing and
settlement of payments by check.251 And banks joining the System as
“members” would be subject to examination and required to maintain
specie reserves against their account money.252
The Board was the lynchpin of the Act, and it revolutionized the
AMS by giving public officials, acting through the FRBs, the ability to
loosen or tighten monetary conditions. Wall Street was adamantly
opposed to this partial de-delegation—the country’s bankers thought
that the Federal Reserve System should operate like the BUS, with a
board controlled by directors selected by private shareholders. But
William Jennings Bryan, who had spent the better part of the prior two
decades fighting to enhance democratic control of the money supply,
insisted on a “Government Board.” For Bryan, then secretary of State;
his ally William McAdoo, the Treasury secretary; and the Democratic
members of Congress who wrote the actual bill that became law, banks,
including state banks, exercised delegated power.253 As Senator Burton

250. Id. §§ 2, 10.
251. Id. § 16.
252. Id. § 19 (requiring twelve to eighteen percent for demand deposits and five percent for
time deposits). The Act also professionalized bank examiners—amending the NBA to require fixed
salaries and impose strict conflict of interest rules. Id. §§ 21-22. In doing so, the Act extended the
“salary revolution in American government” to the banking agencies, see NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO,
AGAINST THE PROFIT Motive: THE SALARY REvolution IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940
(2013), following decades of efforts by successive comptrollers to persuade Congress to eliminate
the fee-based model, see KANE, supra note 127, at 240–41.
HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 87, at 2009, 2011–12
(“[T]he right . . . to issue money is a function of government . . . it is a part of sovereignty, and can
no more with safety be delegated to private individuals than we could afford to delegate to private
individuals the power to make penal statutes or levy taxes.”).
put it, in the final debates before passage: “Those engaged in the business of banking are but the agents of the people. In no line should a higher standard of care and integrity be required.”254 It was because banks were agents of the public that the public, acting through the Board, should be empowered to oversee bank issues and limit bank risks, both at the state and federal levels.

C. Roosevelt and the New Deal Consolidation

But for a variety of reasons, the Fed failed to tame the ever-growing mass of state banks, and competitive deregulation between the states and the federal government eroded separations and precipitated a wave of bank failures in 1932 and 1933.255 In 1933, the AMS almost collapsed. Calls rose up for Congress to nationalize the money supply. Instead, Congress once again steered a middle course and reaffirmed the AMS: it restored the separation of banking and commerce that had deteriorated in the 1920s, it explicitly backstopped bank deposits for the first time, and it strengthened supervision, importing New York’s safety and soundness law into the U.S. Code. Supervision was at the heart of the New Deal consolidation: it was how President Roosevelt justified continued monetary outsourcing to the American people. This Section examines Roosevelt’s reforms and reveals the federal legislature’s persistent commitment to informal supervisory oversight stretching to the present day, even in the face of efforts to temper other aspects of the administrative state.

1. The Banking Act of 1933

Contemporary supervisory law was built in the depths of the Great Depression and in the fifty years that followed. Congress decided that both Lincoln’s national banking plan and Wilson’s central banking scheme put too much control in private hands. Accordingly, they reclaimed powers that had been devolved to bank shareholders and

255. See generally Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings on S. 4115 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 358, 395 (1932) (statement of Eugene Meyer, Governor Federal Reserve Board, Wash., D.C.): [E]ffective supervision of banking in this country has been seriously affected by competition between member and non-member banks . . . [and] competition between the State and National banking systems has resulted in weakening both steadily. National banks, which were granted limited powers by the NBA, pushed into various forms of financial commerce in the 1910s and 1920s. See, e.g., ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR., TAMING THE MEGABANKS: WHY WE NEED A NEW GLASS STEAGALL ACT 31–32 (2020); VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 279–99 (1970). They also succeeded in loosening branching requirements. See CAROSSO, supra, at 242 (eighty-seven banks had branches in 1900; 775 banks did in 1928).
managers by, for the first time, permitting the banking agencies to take remedial actions whenever they determined banks were operating in an unsafe or unsound manner.

Strengthening discretionary supervision was at the heart of Roosevelt’s New Deal banking reforms—one of the few specific financial measures he articulated as a candidate (along with restoring the separation of banking and securities dealing)—and it helped him fend off more radical proposals.256 As Roosevelt told the American people in his inaugural address: “[T]here must be a strict supervision of all banking . . . so that there will be an end to speculation with other people’s money; and there must be provision for an adequate but sound currency.”257

Soon after Roosevelt took office, Congress authorized the Fed, following notice and a hearing, to remove officers and directors who “continued unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the business” of member banks258—just as Congress had empowered the President to remove the heads of independent agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Fed Board itself.259 Congress also empowered the OCC, whenever a director or officer of a national bank violated a law or “continued unsafe or unsound practices,” to refer the matter to the Fed for removal proceedings.260 The OCC’s had been seeking this power for nearly forty years. “For many . . . offenses,” Comptroller John Skelton Williams complained in 1914, “the only penalty which can be enforced by the Comptroller’s office is the forfeiture of the bank’s charter by suit in the United States court.”261 But, often this “would prove a great

256. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Looking Forward 227 (1933) (“The events of the past three years prove that the supervision of national banks for the protection of depositors has been ineffective. I propose much more rigid supervision.”).

257. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1933), in 2 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 13 (1938).

258. This is the second mention of the standard in federal law. Safety and soundness first appeared in section 4 of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. The Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933, reprinted in 4 Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States, supra note 87, at 2697, 2698. Its monetary meaning is indisputable. Id. (authorizing the secretary of the Treasury to restrict banking activities in an emergency so as to “provide for the safer and more effective operation of the National Banking System”; “preserve for the people the full benefits of the currency provided for by the Congress through the National Banking System”; and “relieve interstate commerce of the burdens and obstructions resulting from the receipt on an unsound and unsafe basis of deposits subject to withdrawal by check” (emphasis added)).


hardship to innocent stockholders and depositors, and [thus] can only be resorted to with much reluctance.”262 According to A. Barton Hepburn, comptroller in 1892, “[t]he existence of the power [to remove officers and directors] would deter many who now keep the letter, only to violate the spirit of the law.”263

Just as importantly, Congress established the FDIC and gave it the power to supervise participating banks and, if needed, put those banks into receivership as a “means to reasonably protect the [insurance fund] against the consequences of unsound or dangerous practices on the part of insured banks.” Congress empowered the FDIC to do this whenever its board concluded that an insured bank continued “unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the business of the bank.”264 The advent of deposit insurance marked a major step toward unifying bank oversight at the federal level and put the government’s imprimatur on the monetary liabilities issued by banks.265 Deposits could no longer be confused for a private product, and their supervision by federal officials was now a “term” in the insurance contract as well as in national bank charters.

The decision by Congress to extend oversight through deposit insurance, to substantially strengthen agency power by tying new remedies to discretionary determinations regarding “unsafe and unsound practices,” and to restore separations, which had eroded over the prior thirty years266 reflects a compromise struck between bankers and those who thought that private actors should be stripped of their ability to expand the money supply.267 As Albert C. Agnew, general

262. Id.
263. ANNUAL REPORT (1892), supra note 245, at 43.
266. Politically, Congress's efforts to enhance supervision actually depended on restoring separations: arch segregationists voted for the dramatic expansion in federal power because the reforms also pushed ownership and management of banks back into local hands. IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 256 (2013). Southern banks were run by southerners and operated “entirely on segregated principles.” Id.
267. See, e.g., Rex Tugwell, The Compromising Roosevelt, 6 W. POL. Q. 320, 333 (1953) (describing the Act as “a compromise” and arguing that “the humiliating compromises concluded during this era with the financiers were mistakes”). Many considered the Act an interim measure—a partial corrective that would have to suffice until Congress and the Roosevelt Administration could come up with a permanent solution. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 133, at 59 (stressing that the Act would be only a “bridge or a transition rather than . . . a permanent solution for the situation” (quoting Adolf Berle)); HELEN BURNS, THE AMERICAN BANKING COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS 1933-1935, at 97 (1974) (explaining that the Act “was compromise legislation designed to correct obvious defects in the federal banking laws and to
counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, put it: “Either the bankers of this country will realize that they are guardians of the moneys committed to their charge and will conduct their business accordingly, or banking [i.e., money augmentation] will cease to be a private enterprise and will become a purely governmental function.”

Indeed, in May 1933, Congress revived greenbacks, authorizing the Treasury Secretary to issue up to $3 billion in new notes. And not just the organized left, but a significant number of academics and advisors to Roosevelt thought that the president should go even further and eliminate “fractional reserve” banking altogether. For example, Rex Tugwell, a Columbia economist and influential member of the president’s “Brain Trust,” argued that the government would be a more effective banker than the profit-seeking business community. Eight prominent professors at the University of Chicago proposed shifting to “narrow” banks, which would be permitted to invest only in government-issued currency. In the words of the economist Henry Simons, the so-called “Chicago Plan” would secure the “abolition of private credit as an element in the circulating media” and the “concentration of complete and direct control over the quantity of media in the hands of the central monetary authority.”

Roosevelt steered clear of these measures and instead strengthened the original AMS. But while Roosevelt—like Lincoln and Chase (and Hamilton and Gallatin and Van Buren)—“did not believe in a government-owned and -operated bank,” and while he too rejected the Greenback alternative, he did believe that banks were extensions of the government. “Bankers are not merely partners of the government,” he planned to tell a gathering of the American Bankers Association in 1934.

The new relationship enters into the picture—the relationship of agency. Banks and bankers are . . . in a very true sense the agents of government itself. Why is this so? All you have to do is to read the history of the United States. You are probably at least as familiar as I am with the growth of the control of government over banking . . . [Continually,] Federal supervision was strengthened . . . [Now, banks] are once and for all under the supervision and the agency of the government of the United States . . . The

afford a degree of protection to the bank depositors of the country” and that “[i]ndications were, that at a later date, the administration would again turn to bank reform.”

270. KENNEDY, supra note 260, at 167. See also Charles Albert Hawkins, Our Present Banking Situation and the Remedy, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1933 (arguing for government control of banking).
271. PHILLIPS, supra note 133, at 47–48.
272. Id. at 50.
273. BURNS, supra note 267, at 99 (“He believed that depositors should be protected against bad bankers, that banking should be strictly supervised, and that the ethics of banking should be maintained.”).
WHY SUPERVISE BANKS?

nearest parallel that I can think of is the example of Trustees appointed by one of our Courts to administer an Estate or a Trust. These Trustees must operate under certain definite rules laid down by the Court and, at the same time, the Trustees are responsible to the beneficiaries of the Trust itself.274

As in New York, the basis for this agency relationship was monetary. “We had a bad banking situation,” Roosevelt explained in his first fireside chat:

Some of our bankers had shown themselves either incompetent or dishonest in their handling of the people’s funds. They had used the money entrusted to them in speculations and unwise loans. . . . It was the Government’s job to straighten out this situation and do it as quickly as possible.275

After Roosevelt closed the banks, he assured people he would reopen them once they were “found to be sound,” meaning once people could rest assured that their bank money was as good as base money.276

Modern supervision was built to tame “once and for all” an open access monetary system.

2. The Quiet Period

In the decades that followed, modern supervisory practice took hold even as procedural reformers sought to constrain the growing powers of the administrative state. Indeed, throughout these years the “federal control of banking” was widely lauded with supervisors attentive to the health and viability of their franchisees and bankers careful not to take advantage of their monetary powers for short-term gain. Two developments during this “Quiet Period” bear special attention: (i) the approving treatment of administrative reformers of the banking agencies and (ii) the repeated efforts by Congress to reinforce and strengthen informal supervisory power.

a. The Administrative Procedure Act

Before the ink was dry on Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation, reformers were working to rein in what they saw as the excesses of the expanded administrative state. They were particularly concerned with procedural fairness and judicial review of agency action. But they treated the banking agencies differently. Banks were not like other

274. Roosevelt, supra note 45, at 2–3 (emphases added).
275. President Roosevelt Delivers His First “Fireside Chat,” March 12, 1933, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 87, at 2709, 2711.
276. Id. at 2709.
businesses; they were the government’s monetary instrumentalities and their overseers were entitled to special solicitude.277

For example, in 1940, the Justice Department established a special committee on administrative procedure, which published a report and a series of fourteen monographs on administrative agencies, including two on the banking agencies. Although the committee recommended that some of its general reform proposals apply to the banking agencies, it otherwise endorsed the informal and “summary” nature of supervisory power, which it explicitly recognized as a longstanding feature of American banking law.278

As the committee put it, “[t]he nature of banking and of the public interest in banks shape the procedural aspects of bank supervision in forms different from those encountered in other branches of administrative regulation.” In the committee’s view, supervision was procedurally tolerable because the structure of the banking system constrained both the banks and the agencies:

The paradox in the situation is that the sanctions are so compelling that the authorities almost never use them. Because the banks are so important in an industrial-commercial economy, compulsive steps [by the agencies] which might shake confidence [in the banks] are withheld. Although there is in fact an iron hand within the velvet glove of the banking authorities, the glove is seldom removed.279

The committee was aware that the banking agencies were opaque.280 It also recognized that banks were “subjected to a general supervision through examination the intensity of which has few, if any, parallels in other fields of regulation.”281 But according to the committee, the

277. See, e.g., Joint Statement on Behalf of the Minority of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 1394 (1941) (noting that the Treasury points to its “fiscal and monetary functions” in requesting that the comptroller of the currency “be exempted in connection with the regulation of national banks” from the formal procedures in the APA).

278. ATT’Y GEN’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., FEDERAL CONTROL OF BANKING: COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY AND FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Pt. 13, at 2 (1940) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONTROL OF BANKING]. “Banks and banking presented complex problems calling for special knowledge and continuing and detailed supervision, not possible for either Congress or the courts . . . .” ATT’Y GEN’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, APPOINTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, TO INVESTIGATE THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM IN VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND TO SUGGEST IMPROVEMENTS THEREIN 15 (1941). These conclusions are consistent with those reached by the Brownlow Commission. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 40–41 (1937) (explaining that banks are “federal business corporations” chartered “by a supervisory agency” and that their statutes confine “their operations to a unitary purpose and describe their organization, powers, and relationships in considerable detail” and that these “special supervisory agencies” should “give continuous and careful scrutiny to [banks’] affairs,” if necessary, independently from executive control).

279. FEDERAL CONTROL OF BANKING, supra note 278, at 18.

280. Id. at 43. (“[T]he exercise of supervisory powers over banks has traditionally been attended by a secrecy antithetical to the publicity which marks most regulatory activities.”).

281. Id.
“intimate nature of this type of control precludes its exercise through a formal procedure.”

The committee’s conclusions were also consistent with those reached by a major reform initiative spearheaded by the American Bar Association. That initiative exempted the banking agencies from a law that would have created a special appeals court for administrative agencies.

The reform that ultimately prevailed—the APA—preserves supervision. This is because the APA’s procedural protections are triggered by formal actions and the banking agencies are designed to proceed informally. Moreover, when the banking agencies do take formal actions, they are often subject to a generous standard of review. In 1946, the Fed even argued that its decision to remove a banker from office was unreviewable under section 10 of the APA because removal was “committed to agency discretion” by law. Although the Supreme Court did not buy this argument, two justices thought the Board’s judgment was reviewable only for abuse of discretion, and the agencies have successfully avoided judicial review on these grounds in other cases.

During this period, both tacitly and explicitly, leading administrative law scholars acknowledged that supervision was...
distinctive in an increasingly uniform regulatory world. For example, when James Landis reviewed administrative agencies in 1960, he left the banking agencies out entirely.\footnote{14} And Kenneth Culp Davis, another administrative law luminary, wrote in 1966: “I have long been and continue to be an admirer of the manner in which the banking agencies have effectively used sensible systems of supervision and have generally avoided the cumbersome procedure of formal adjudication.”\footnote{15}

This positive treatment is perhaps unsurprising given that, for most of American history, administrative authority was widely perceived, not as a threat to liberty, but as “a means of protecting liberty and the public interest against private power.”\footnote{16} And banks were one of the quintessential examples of such power and the source of unceasing political dispute up until the New Deal.

It is likely for that reason that the Supreme Court in 1963 endorsed supervisory governance as perhaps the “most successful . . . system[ ] of economic regulation” to which “we may owe, in part, the virtual disappearance of bank failures from the American economic scene.”\footnote{17} The “governmental controls of American banking,” the Court explained, “are manifold . . . [b]ut perhaps the most effective weapon of federal regulation of banking is the broad visitatorial power” with its “frequent and intensive” examinations permitting “virtually a day-to-day surveillance of the American banking system.”\footnote{18} According to the Court, “[a]s a result of the existence of [a] panoply of sanctions, recommendations by the agencies concerning banking practices tend to be followed by bankers without the necessity of formal compliance proceedings.”\footnote{19}

b. The Financial Institutions Supervisory Act

If the years leading up and through the passage of the APA promised that supervision would remain an important part of American public administration, the 1960s reaffirmed that commitment. Indeed, during this decade, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act (“FISA”), giving the banking agencies, among other things, the power to issue cease and desist orders targeting

\footnote{15} Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Procedure in the Regulation of Banking, 31 L. & Contemp. Probs. 713, 715 (1966). Davis was also critical of the banking agencies. He thought, for example, that their decisions on chartering and branching should be more “open” to public review. \textit{Id.} at 713.
\footnote{16} \textit{White}, supra note 31, at 464.
\footnote{18} \textit{Id.} at 327, 329.
\footnote{19} \textit{Id.} at 330.
practices that, in the opinion of the agencies, are unsafe or unsound. 296 This authority allowed the agencies to force banks, in their discretion, to change aspects of their business, from hiring to underwriting to balance sheet management. 297

Congress passed FISA at the behest of the Johnson Administration, which was concerned about risky bank lending that was difficult for the agencies to combat using their existing toolkit. The Administration explained that the “supervisory agencies in varying degrees have been seriously handicapped in their efforts to prevent irresponsible and undesirable practices” because the remedies were too “drastic” and “cumbersome.” In other words, it was hard to threaten bankers with severe sanctions like removal just for aggressively pursuing profits.

Congress, in granting the “administration’s request for additional flexible and effective supervisory powers,” justified the move on monetary grounds, once again adopting an outsourcing model. The “vital importance of [a] sound and effective system of banks,” the Senate’s FISA report explained, “is clear” as the “banking system is a fundamental part of our monetary system and the Nation’s $130 billion of demand deposits represents the principal element in the Nation’s money supply.” 298 Wright Patman, the chairman of the House Banking Committee, explicitly invoked the Constitution’s monetary clauses. 299


297. Congress, in drafting FISA, relied on a memorandum by John Horne, the chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and S. 3695 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and the Currency, 89th Cong. 49 (1966). Horne explained that “safety and soundness” was a legal standard and that “[f]or this reason, it would be virtually impossible to attempt to catalog within a single all-inclusive or rigid definition the broad spectrum of activities” that it embraces. Id. Indeed, the “formulation of such a definition would probably operate to exclude those practices not set out in the definition, even though they might be highly injurious to an institution under a given set of facts or circumstances or a scheme developed by unscrupulous operators to avoid the reach of law.” Id. at 49–50.

[A] particular activity not necessarily unsafe or unsound in every instance may be so when considered in the light of all relevant facts. Thus, what may be an acceptable practice for an institution with a strong reserve position, such as concentration in higher risk lending, may well be unsafe or unsound for a marginal operation.

Id. at 49. Horne nonetheless offered something of a definition:

Generally speaking, an “unsafe or unsound practice” embraces any action, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance funds.

Id. at 50.


299. 112 CONG. REC. 24,983 (1966) (Statement of Rep. Wright Patman) (arguing in favor of 12 U.S.C. § 1818 on the grounds that “we in Congress, in carrying out our mandate under article I, section 8, clause 5, of the Constitution to assure the public of a sound monetary system, must be constantly alert to possible weaknesses in our financial system”).
FISA empowered the agencies to make case-by-case judgments about bank operations. “To be effective,” one Fed official explained, the agencies “must scrupulously avoid imposing conditions ‘too quickly and too great,’ but he must be even more alert to avoid committing the unpardonable sin of bank supervision of doing ‘too little, too late.’”  

For example, in a bank where asset quality is deteriorating, a supervisor must “try to determine whether there had been a weakening in the loan servicing procedures or in the bank’s basic lending policies.” And if a supervisor finds “[a] noticeable increase” in problem loans, the agency might issue “a transmittal letter urging the directors to review the bank’s lending policies and to take such action as is necessary to obtain additional security for weak loans, reductions or definite repayment programs.”

This sort of authority is difficult to explain if we view banks as private businesses working primarily to generate returns for their shareholders. But it is perfectly intelligible if we recognize that banks work primarily for the government as part of a system to augment the money supply for the benefit of the nation’s households and businesses. The theory of banking that has grounded the AMS for more than 150 years does not see banks as private entities. Instead, it sees banks as special, serving a key role in economic governance.

c. Further Statutory Enhancements

Even as policy makers lost sight of this theory of banking and conflict began to emerge between banks and the banking agencies, Congress continued to buttress supervisory governance. To take just a few examples, in 1978, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act (“FIRIRCA”), authorizing the agencies to issue cease-and-desist orders against individuals, levy civil money penalties against both institutions and individuals, and remove executives in a greater range of circumstances. In 1983, Congress enacted the International Lending Supervision Act, section 908 of...
which limits judicial review of agency orders regarding bank capital. And in 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”), changing various provisions to further narrow the scope for judicial review.

Nor did Congress’s commitment to supervisory governance fade in the new millennium. In 2001, when it repealed longstanding structural barriers separating banking from other financial activities, Congress added new approval authority tied to agency supervisory judgments about the quality of bank management. And in 2010, when it passed the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress created new methods of “enhanced supervision” for large financial conglomerates, requiring, among other things, periodic stress testing. As the Tenth Circuit explained in 2012, while the law sometimes “leaves banks in the position of enduring any vicissitudes attending the exercise of the regulator’s discretion, Congress is permitted to prioritize the safety of the banking system over banks’ interest in avoiding subjective or even harsh agency decision.”

III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BANK SUPERVISION

The history of the AMS presents a puzzle. On the one hand, the AMS, with bank supervision at its core, has a long pedigree and has endured numerous shocks, only to be strengthened time and again. On the other hand, as we saw in Part I, the practice of supervision has been steadily dismantled and reconceptualized over the last thirty years and the outsourcing model underlying it has fallen out of the academic (and

(5th Cir. 1983). See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(b)(1) (“Failure . . . to maintain capital at or above its minimum level . . . may be deemed by the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, to constitute an unsafe and unsound practice within the meaning of section 1818.”).


307. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-54, at 392 (1989) (Conf. Rep.). The status of banks at this point was very much in dispute, with consensus having shifted toward the licensing model. But key members of Congress retained an outsourcing view. For example, the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, William Proxmire, asked H. Robert Heller, one of the Fed’s governors, whether he thought banks were “essentially private sector entities which perform certain public sector services or . . . quasi-public financial utilities on which societal demands can be loaded?” Heller, a champion of the cresting deregulatory wave, told Proxmire that banks were “not public utilities.” Yet even Heller noted that banks “perform a number of specialized functions that are vital to the effective functioning of the nation’s monetary system.” Adopting the “agent theory” and a moral hazard frame, Heller argued that the “public financial commitment implied by [deposit insurance and direct access to a lender of last resort] . . . requires a regulatory framework designed to establish safe and sound operation.” Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Oversight on the Condition of the Financial Services Industry, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 735, 513 (1988).


political) consciousness, replaced by a licensing model that treats banks as mere intermediaries. Today, supervision is often seen as vestigial or worse, a malignancy.\footnote{See, e.g., CONTI-BROWN, supra note 59, at 169 (“we lack a clear theory of what bank supervisors are even supposed to do in a world with long lists of federal and state statutory compliance requirements”).} What explains the erosion of this central pillar of American public administration?

This Part attributes it to structural decay: the emergence of shadow banking and the rise of universal banking.\footnote{See supra Section II.B.} It argues that supervisory governance requires more than just broad statutory powers; it must be sustained by a particular political economy that supports bank franchise value and limits bank activities. When these foundations eroded, supervision became vulnerable to intellectual attack. As often happens, ideological change followed political and economic transformation.

A. Mixing Banking and Commerce

The AMS began to deteriorate in the 1950s, prompted by the emergence of financial economics as a discipline and the rise of “shadow” banks (firms that issue money instruments similar to deposits but do not have a banking charter). Financial economics abstracted away from money as a social and political construct—ignoring the need to create a monetary unit and build a system for buying and selling in that unit—and modeled banks as financial intermediaries, firms with assets and liabilities of various durations.\footnote{See, e.g., supra notes 50–53; Mark Flannery, Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Bank Regulation, Fed. Res. Bank Phila. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 1982, at 17 (“Bankers insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can benefit privately by undertaking risks that the society as a whole considers excessive. Restrictive bank regulations can thus be viewed as an effort to undo (or at least to limit) the distortive impact of deposit insurance on bank decisions.”).} This approach allowed for advances in economic theory,\footnote{Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958); 16 HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1971).} but collapsed the distinction between money substitutes and other debt. It also assimilated banking to private finance, implicitly recharacterizing banking laws as “interventions” instead of acts of constitution. These intellectual currents replaced the outsourcing model with the licensing model.

The licensing model was able to take hold, in part, because of fundamental changes in the business of banking. First, after 1936,\footnote{KENNETH D. GARRIADE, BIRTH OF A MARKET 328–31 (2012).} the Fed became the exclusive issuer of physical bank notes. Paper money issued by privately owned banks disappeared. Although these banks continued to issue its monetary equivalent, account money,
account money only exists on the books of the bank and not in the physical world. The result is that scholars and policymakers often lump it together with other debt liabilities, making a theory of banks as mere financial intermediaries appear more plausible.315

The other major change occurred in the 1950s when the Fed began to treat Wall Street securities dealers similarly to banks and to assist them in expanding the money supply even though they lacked a banking charter.316 The result was a decline in the franchise value of banks, a concomitant rise in the importance of securities dealers, and the erosion of the New Deal monetary architecture.317

These changes in banking and finance, along with the rise of money market mutual funds (another issuer of deposit substitutes), prompted responses that further eroded the AMS. For example, in the 1980s, policy makers began to break down the separation of banking and commerce. With bank profitability squeezed, and bankers complaining of increased competition from shadow banks, the OCC and the Fed sought to level the playing field by removing restrictions on the asset side of bank balance sheets. The OCC, for example, reinterpreted the NBA to permit national banks to purchase derivatives.318 According to the OCC, the execution and clearance of customer transactions in securities, futures, and options, regardless of the nature of the underlying asset, was an attribute of the “business of banking” and was, therefore, permissible. As Saule Omarova explains, defining “the statutory concept of the ‘business of banking’ as a broadly understood process of financial intermediation . . . rendered [the] concept meaningless as a potentially limiting device.”319

315. Our jargon has not helped in this regard: although it is common to say that a bank “takes” a deposit, the stock of deposit liabilities is, in fact, issued. See Ricks, supra note 50, at 760–62 (arguing that the rise of the financial intermediation paradigm can be attributed to the decline of bank notes and the rise of financial economics).


The repurchase agreements entered into by dealers with nonfinancial corporations not only impair the investment market for short-term U. S. obligations; they represent in substance a nullification of the intent of the Banking Act of 1933 . . . to forbid banking activities outside the supervised banking system, and to exclude payment of interest on demand deposits. They tend to reduce deposits in money market banks and remove resources which could be available for loans to dealers.


Once banks began engaging in nonmonetary activities—in “financial commerce”—policymakers began to scrutinize other aspects of the system. They challenged laws prohibiting banks from combining with other types of financial intermediaries.\footnote{320} Alan Greenspan, who became chair of the Fed in 1987, pressed Congress to repeal statutory barriers separating banks and securities dealers.\footnote{321} And the Fed issued new rules permitting companies that owned banks to earn up to twenty-five percent of their revenues from previously prohibited broker-dealer and corporate finance activities.\footnote{322} In Greenspan’s view, there was no reason to prevent bank holding companies (“BHCs”) from engaging in these businesses; if anything, permitting BHCs to enter the securities business would strengthen them by increasing their profitability.\footnote{323}

The demise of one key pillar of the AMS—separation—led to intensified scrutiny of another: supervision. As the difference between banks supervised by the banking agencies and other financial intermediaries diminished, agency leaders and other policymakers began to question why banks should continue to be subject to onerous government oversight.\footnote{324} Economists at the Fed, in particular, concluded that traditional supervision was costly and inefficient and that big, complex financial conglomerates were best disciplined by market forces. Greenspan and his colleagues also suspected that substantively overseeing risk taking by financial conglomerates would be difficult; accordingly, they developed ways for bank shareholders and creditors to discipline banks instead.\footnote{325} To these skeptics, supervision was an anachronism. The contemporary business of banking was far more sophisticated than its early-century antecedents. Its complexity demanded less government oversight and more faith in markets.

\footnote{320. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to the Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INT’L L. 441 (2017).}
\footnote{324. See Menand, supra note 17, at 1564–71.}
\footnote{325. Id.; Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks to the American Bankers Association: The Evolution of Bank Supervision 3–4 (Oct. 11, 1999) (transcript available from the Federal Reserve) (“[I]n contemplating the growing complexity of our largest banking organizations, it seems to us that the supervisors have little choice but to try to rely more—not less—on market discipline—augmented by more effective public disclosures—to carry an increasing share of the oversight load.”).}
WHY SUPERVISE BANKS?

The Fed and its sister agencies thus shifted toward complex capital rules, which they believed would control bank risk more efficiently. These capital rules required shareholders to maintain a certain amount of the skin in the game. The agencies thought that such equity stakes would incentivize shareholders to monitor bank executives.326 Meanwhile, the agencies would use their safety and soundness authority to ensure market participants had access to accurate information about bank risks. Their new policy, known as RFS, involved policing processes—governance frameworks, internal controls, and risk management techniques. RFS was designed to prevent bank executives from hiding material information from investors.327 Market incentives, rather than informal oversight, would ensure that the banking system ran smoothly.

Policy makers also discouraged Congress from regulating shadow banks. Accordingly, repo and commercial paper markets expanded rapidly, and the money market mutual fund industry grew to $3 trillion.328 By 2008, national banks supervised by the OCC and other financial businesses like investment banks played similar monetary roles. Whereas investment banks once financed themselves with equity and long-term debt, by 2008 they used deposit substitutes, even though they were not supervised for safety and soundness and had no formal access to government liquidity programs.329

By the early 2000s, two of four pillars of the AMS had been severely weakened. The new monetary order retained delegation and open access: administratively charted, privately owned corporations, not the government, still created the bulk of the money supply. But the crucial separation of money creation and commercial dealing was gone. Desupervision followed close behind.

326. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks to the American Bankers Association: Innovation and Regulation of Banks in the 1990s, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1988) (transcript available from the Federal Reserve) (“The key to engendering market incentives,” Greenspan explained, “is to require that those owners who would profit from an institution’s success have the appropriate amount of their own capital at risk.”); id. (“There is no better way to ensure that owners exert discipline on the behavior of their firm than to require that they have a large stake in that enterprise.”).

327. See Menand, supra note 17, at 1567–74; Meyer, supra note 64, at 99–101.

328. RICKS, supra note , at 33–34 (Figure 1.2).

329. The crisis was a product of this decay: Deposit substitutes were not insured by the government, and although the businesses and individuals who held them did not consider themselves to be investors in the issuers, they badly misjudged. See Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411 (2017); PISTOR, supra note 103, at 92. When it became clear that the issuers might fail and that the government did not stand behind these instruments, panic ensued. See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010).
B. Desupervision

This Section connects the structural changes in the political economy of finance to the shift away from supervision. It explains how the emergence of shadow banking and the rise of universal banking created a structural mismatch between supervisors’ jurisdiction and their monetary function, undermining one of the normative underpinnings of supervisory governance. Whereas banks once embraced, or at least did not effectively resist, discretionary government oversight, today they are actively undermining informal methods.331

1. The Problem with Shadow Banking

The first part of the structural mismatch is between the scope of private money augmentation and the bounds of banking agency jurisdiction. Shadow banks like securities dealers, foreign firms, and money market mutual funds now issue huge amounts of deposit substitutes, used primarily by businesses and institutional investors. When Congress imported safety and soundness into the U.S. Code in 1933 and expanded supervisory authority in the 1960s, these deposit substitutes did not exist. By the mid-1990s, they rivaled deposits as a component of the money supply. By 2007, they reached seventy-five percent of the total outstanding money stock.332

This sort of shadow banking is not new. Indeed, the 2008 crisis was eerily reminiscent of the panic of 1907 and the 1933 collapse. All three disasters were the product of runs on money instruments that policymakers had failed to perceive and regulate as such. In 1907 and 1933, those instruments were deposits issued by state chartered entities. In 2008, they were deposit substitutes issued by securities dealers, money market mutual funds, and foreign financial firms.

But the jurisdictional gap creates several pressing challenges. First, it prevents supervisors from monitoring and disciplining important issuers. Strict government oversight is not a solution for

330. See, e.g., Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918, 77th Cong. 1478 (1941) (Statement of Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle) (“B[anking representatives themselves have never complained concerning the absence of formal hearings, but, on the contrary, prefer the present methods.”).  
331. See supra note 21.  
332. RICKS, supra note 103, at 33–35.  
monetary outsourcing if only some private money issuers are subject to it. Second, the gap undermines a key rationale for state oversight. Why should banks submit to the same strict government oversight when their charters no longer confer the same valuable privileges? Third, and perhaps most importantly, money augmentation by firms that are not regulated like banks undermines the franchise value of banks. Banks in recent decades have routinely resisted costly risk reduction measures imposed by the government, in part because these measures are no longer tied to a special privilege that generates offsetting gains.

2. The Problem with Universal Banking

The second part of the structural mismatch is between the purpose of state oversight and the activities of today’s banking conglomerates. As discussed in Part II, when the statutes that comprise the AMS were enacted in the 1860s, 1930s, and 1960s, bank balance sheets were strictly limited to high-quality credit assets: government bonds and various types of senior debt. The regulatory regime—safety and soundness law—was designed for these assets.

With the emergence of new and riskier forms of financial investments and activities, and new and more complex financial conglomerates, the old tools became less potent. Safety and soundness law, with its broad scope and sharp remedies, was not designed to put government officials in the middle of market making, asset management, underwriting, commodities dealing, or private equity investing (banks were not permitted to engage in these activities at the time the laws were written). These activities were considered financial commerce, and banks, given their quasi-governmental status and power, were to steer clear of commerce. Nor did policymakers expect supervisors to be able to reach timely and accurate judgments about bank solvency when volatile and complex assets dominated the left-hand side of bank balance sheets.³³⁴ This mismatch fuels supervisory disarmament. In the late 1990s, the Fed crafted RFS in part because it believed supervising the asset-side activities of financial conglomerates would be hard if not impossible.³³⁵ And today, financial conglomerates demand procedural protections of the sort enjoyed by the nonbanks they compete with in so much of their business. Mixing banking and commerce, in other words,

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³³⁴. See, e.g., Menand, supra note 17.
³³⁵. Greenspan and his colleagues thought that the capital rules would prevent excessive risk-taking because market participants would do what supervisors could not. But shareholders and managers, rather than reining in such risk-taking, often promote it, as they stand to gain from increased returns and banks, due to their monetary functions, can expect support from the state if their risks do not pay off. See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 52, at 97–99.
has created a situation in which the normative assumptions underpinning the outsourcing model (delegated state power requires close state control) have become obscured.

The result is a less stable equilibrium both practically and politically. For example, the tension between informal, discretionary oversight and modern finance erodes the norms that govern and sustain the banker-supervisor relationship. When banks were small and dispersed, they were critical infrastructure in their local communities. Accordingly, the agencies had to work with them to solve problems—bankers had a certain degree of leverage. Today, by contrast, many banks are expendable, as large conglomerates operate nationwide. And while large conglomerates are not expendable, they are less vulnerable to discipline. This means that many soft constraints on supervisory overreach no longer exist. Meanwhile, large conglomerates are more capable of resisting supervisory direction, leading to further conflict.

For generations, supervision was paired with portfolio-shaping rules that prohibited banks from engaging in fast moving, difficult-to-monitor financial dealing. Rules also limited banks in size and scope and gave them a monopoly on satisfying money demand. During this period, supervision was built to succeed. But allowing banks to merge and engage in speculative financial activities undermined supervisory efficacy. It also disrupted the ability of nonbanks to compete in these markets. The banking agencies now face a difficult task: monitoring financial conglomerates engaged in a range of complex activities. In such an environment, relinquishing oversight threatens further instability. In fact, the urgency of supervision is greater in a banking system without separation. Desupervision under the current regime means private actors are more likely to exercise public power for private purposes, pocketing gains and socializing losses.

CONCLUSION

This Article began with a question: Why did Congress design the banking agencies to exercise supervisory power? Part I considered several answers, none of which engaged in the relevant legislative history or considered the operative statutory text. Part II recovered this history and analyzed this text. It traced the rise of the American Monetary Settlement, locating the origins of that settlement alongside bank supervision in antebellum state law, and it showed how New York, Massachusetts, and other states commissioned special government officials to outsource money creation to private actors and still ensure that the money those actors issued was sound. It revealed that the federal government imported New York’s model during the Civil War and refined the AMS during the Great Depression with the same ends.
in mind. It categorized supervision as a type of administrative law in which the government acts as an outsourcer rather than as a regulator of private activity. And it showed how even reformers in the mid-twentieth century treated this distinctive form of governance as necessary and legitimate. It then identified the root cause of desupervision today—a mismatch between the rationale for supervisory oversight and the scope of supervised conduct. In the process, it showed why recent challenges to the legitimacy of post-crisis supervisory initiatives are misplaced. “Safety and soundness” is not a “black hole.” Nor are the stress tests an instance of aberrant government overreach. Bank supervision—and the scrutiny of banks by expert government officials—is one of the central planks of a public-private monetary system whose legal structures, norms, and practices predate the Civil War.

The AMS may well be permanently damaged and shadow and universal banking here to stay. If so, policymakers must confront the twin deficits of our current system: instability and rent extraction. Monetary regimes dominated by private control are fragile. And the government’s efforts to prevent them from melting down during recessions transfers wealth away from the public. This suggests, at the very least, strengthening public oversight, not diminishing it. Stress tests are critical tools in this effort—they allow the government to constrain risk taking, limiting instability and reducing rent extraction. In that way, they are a modern variation on an old theme, designed to counteract the new pressures posed by conglomerations. Stress tests draw on technical expertise and the legitimacy and authority of the central bank. To sacrifice their rigor in the name of administrative law regularity would jeopardize public welfare based on an ahistorical and ungrounded reading of the American banking tradition and American banking law. It is telling that our principal response to the last financial crisis was to fortify and update a traditional form of oversight. Weakening bank supervision now, only a decade removed from catastrophe, and in the midst of a new economic crisis, would reject wisdom hard-won over centuries.