In his introduction to An Appeal to the World!, the NAACP’s 1947 petition to the nascent United Nations, W.E.B. Du Bois argued that systematic discrimination against Black Americans represented a danger not only to U.S. democracy, but “to the nations of the world.” As he sought redress on the global stage for this mistreatment, Du Bois insisted that this question, “which is without doubt primarily an internal and national question, becomes inevitably an international question and will in the future become more and more international, as the nations draw together.”
That the renowned writer, activist, and scholar saw such transnational linkages in 1947 should come as no surprise. In his closing address to the first Pan-African Conference in 1900, Du Bois famously stated that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line.” In his popular 1920 essay collection Darkwater, he described “whiteness” as a type of “title to the universe,” bringing together into one frame American segregation and European colonialism. And in his magnum opus Black Reconstruction, published in 1935, Du Bois identified the defeat of Reconstruction not only with Redemption and Jim Crow, but also with a new project of overseas racial and commercial empire.
It is this sustained engagement with the problem of the color line that has helped establish Du Bois as a leading sociologist, historian, and, more generally, as a model scholar-activist. It is also, I argue in a forthcoming article, why he belongs in the canon of American legal thought.
That Du Bois is so rarely taken seriously today as a legal theorist should surprise us. Du Bois did much that scholars, especially within LPE, celebrate in his contemporaries, the Legal Realists: bringing social scientific methods to bear on the study of law; challenging orthodox distinctions between property and sovereignty; and critiquing laissez-faire, just to name a few. What sets Du Bois apart, however, was that he placed at the center of his analysis the problem of racial injustice, in both its domestic and transnational forms. Rather than colorblind critiques of classical legal thought, his theorizing emerged out of practical commitments to racial justice, and to realizing multiracial democracy, which led him toward, among other things, more fundamental critiques of the U.S. Constitution.
Race and Legal Realism
These commitments were simply not among the Legal Realists’ concerns. As earlier work has emphasized, the Realists essentially ignored questions of race. At least for those on its most progressive wing, the movement’s central preoccupation was challenging the idea of a self-regulating market system, part of what Joseph Singer has described as a “pragmatic critique of power.” Race certainly could have played a prominent theoretical role in such work, helping to explain how markets were constituted and power relations reproduced, especially at greater scales and temporalities. But the Realists remained committed in their race blindness. As other scholars have identified, if Realism found any serious expression around the problem of the color line, it was through Charles Hamilton Houston, the famed NAACP litigator and former dean of Howard University Law School, whose mentors included Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter.
This is not to say that race was entirely absent from the Realists’ work. As legal historian Dylan Penningroth has recently uncovered, “‘colored’ cases” played an underappreciated role in Realist theorizing—underappreciated because the Realists themselves deemphasized, or even erased, the reality of race. They used cases involving Black people to illustrate their points, but without affording race any explanatory or normative significance. As Penningroth puts it, “they thought through Black people without thinking very much about Black people.”
The starkest absence of such concern lies in the work of Robert Hale. Hale, the main protagonist in Barbara Fried’s classic The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire, did more than any Realist to explain how a legal regime underpinning supposedly free market exchange could just as easily be understood as a system of coercion. Protecting property rights above all, particularly in contexts involving uneven distributions of wealth, meant property owners could compel others to work for less than satisfying terms. “Coercion,” not “liberty,” whether of contract or property, was the better way to describe such a system.
One can easily imagine how such a project might have led to deeper engagement with law’s role in the production and reproduction of racial subordination, and the consequences of this subordination for a broader political-economic order. But this never became Hale’s project. This is all the more surprising given that Hale explicitly gave the Thirteenth Amendment, and ambiguities around “involuntary servitude,” considered treatment in later texts, including in an influential 1943 article and again in his magisterial Freedom Through Law, published in 1952. Yet this treatment merely aimed to complicate ideas around voluntariness, not to problematize pervasive racial injustice.
Recovering Du Bois
As Du Bois’s work demonstrates, one could certainly accomplish both tasks at once. In a 1901 essay, for instance, Du Bois identified the convict-lease and crop-lien systems as each emerging from the ashes of slavery. Though the latter operated through “private” rather than public law, it nonetheless placed “the personal liberty of the free black laborer . . . into the hands of the landowner and merchant.”
In part because of his focus on race, Du Bois’s intellectual project went beyond identifying the ubiquity of “coercion.” Instead, his thinking and writing were grounded in the political goal of genuine emancipation, which Du Bois also expressed through his active participation in movements for civil rights and decolonization. Such commitments are evident in the more normatively inflected language he used in his theorizing. Among his most memorable phrases was the “dictatorship of property,” which Du Bois introduced in Black Reconstruction to challenge the more typical theoretical separation between property and sovereignty and to diagnose counterrevolutionary forces opposed to multiracial democracy.
Such examples abound in Du Bois’s work, though many have essentially been forgotten. In 1911, for example, Du Bois argued that “mob violence” in the South was being translated into new forms of “legal violence,” expressed through the array of laws supporting segregation, which ultimately limited opportunities for Black wealth-building. While canonical Realists focused on how judicial reasoning masked laissez-faire ideology, Du Bois here identifies how the more general status of law obscured what he saw as a type of structural violence. By innovating the label of “legal violence,” and naming it as a successor to Lynch Law, Du Bois at once complicated notions of coercion, named a profound injustice, and undercut the legitimacy of law.
It is perhaps because of his unmistakable radicalism—which led him to break with the NAACP (twice) and reject Cold War liberalism—that Du Bois remains underexamined as a legal and constitutional thinker. While critical legal scholars, from Derrick Bell to Cheryl Harris, have certainly drawn on Du Bois to build out their own important theorizing, more systematic treatment of his thought has remained virtually nonexistent until a recent flurry of scholarship.
My hope is that this new wave of scholarship will lead critical legal scholars to reassess both Du Bois’s absence from the canon, and the reverence often afforded the Legal Realists. There is, of course, no doubt that the Realists left us important insights, but there are costs to placing them at the heart of a critical and reconstructive project like LPE. To put the point a bit differently, we might ask, with big tent goals in mind, whether one is more likely to feel affinity toward a collective project that understands itself as operating in the tradition of someone like Du Bois, or perhaps Crystal Eastman, rather than the canonical Realists.
There is much more to say about Du Bois (for that, you can see my article), but one final point should be emphasized. While his sheer brilliance certainly helped, it was his active participation in a range of social movements—for civil rights, decolonization, and global peace—together with his own identity and positionality, that constantly pulled Du Bois toward a set of largely neglected questions and topics, especially within the American legal academy, and grounded his analysis of the color line as a global, imperial, political-economic structure. It was this engagement in local and transnational politics that led him to conclude, as he did in An Appeal to the World!, that the anti-democratic features of the U.S. Constitution and oligarchic concentrations of economic power, each fortified by race discrimination and racial ideology, were not only mutually supporting, but would become problems for the world.
This analytic framework remains as relevant as ever, and Du Bois’s work, more broadly, speaks to our present far better than the traditional canon. There of course remains plenty of work to be done demystifying the social and economic order. But our conjuncture, a time of trillionaires and open white supremacy, calls for a different posture. As the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. observed, while speaking at a 1968 event posthumously honoring Du Bois on the occasion of his 100th birthday, “the truths he revealed are not yet the property of all Americans but they have been recorded and arm us for our contemporary battles.”