Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for reorganization, allows businesses to rework their debt structure, streamline operations, and emerge as viable organizations. At first blush, churches may seem like an odd fit for chapter 11 reorganization. Besides the Catholic dioceses which now readily come to people’s minds when thinking about bankruptcy and churches, and whose cases center on resolving sexual abuse claims, how might churches use and benefit from reorganization? This question led me to a surprising story about bankruptcy—one that is, at its core, a study of lending to Black-owned businesses and of Black communities’ fight against yet another attempt to extract wealth from their institutions and families.
Forgive Us Our Debts: How Black Churches Use Bankruptcy to Survive tells the story of churches—mainly Black churches—turning to chapter 11 reorganization when faced with recalcitrant lenders to keep their spiritual doors open and hold onto the equity housed in their buildings. Based on my research, nationwide, a bit over 1,000 religious organizations filed chapter 11 between 2006 and 2021. Notably, over 60% of filing churches were Black churches, defined as having congregations with at least 80% Black members, despite no more than a quarter of congregations nationwide being Black churches. Something particular had led Black churches, year after year, more so than churches with other member demographics, to the bankruptcy system.
Churches, like any other businesses, need money to operate and to purchase or build houses of worship. Like businesses, they turn to credit markets and lenders for the money—which, in times of financial and operational troubles, gives lenders the opportunity to foreclose. Churches’ chapter 11 cases showed that churches often filed while under active threat of foreclosure. They also showed that the churches held equity—value beyond the amount that they owed lenders—in their buildings.
That most churches held equity in their buildings was a bit surprising. Also surprising was that many churches’ reorganization cases seemed to revolve around mortgage lenders and dealt with very few other creditors. Reorganization is thought of as a collective proceeding to bring various parties to the negotiating table, not as a tool to handle claims from one creditor, like a mortgage lender. Reorganization is also most beneficial to save property that is underwater. A lender should be expected to more readily negotiate with a business outside bankruptcy when there is equity in the property—that is, when the creditor is over-secured.
To learn more, I spoke with leaders who had placed their churches into chapter 11 and bankruptcy attorneys who had represented over 125 of the churches that had filed during my study timeframe. Hidden within reorganization cases that on their face seemed to be about operational and financial problems were stories of disparate lending to the Black community—and stories of successfully leveraging bankruptcy law when no other avenues remained to negotiate with stubborn lenders. They are stories that resonate with others that we know about our racialized financial system, such as studies finding that Black people pay more across credit products—auto loans, credit cards, home loans, and student loans—and are less likely to be offered credit by traditional lenders.
My discussions with pastors and bankruptcy attorneys confirmed that expensive loans and stubborn lenders, not simply churches’ financial and operational hardships, shaped their decisions to file bankruptcy. Some Black churches were sold the equivalent of subprime home loans to purchase, renovate, or expand buildings. These loans came from mainstream banks and from more bespoke lenders, including Christian-based lenders who purported to care about churches’ spiritual missions. And churches that started out with more conventional loans encountered difficult lenders when they fell behind on payments. Lenders were often slow to negotiate or simply refused to negotiate.
The Story of Prayer Tabernacle Church of Love
Bishop Kenneth Moales Sr. founded Prayer Tabernacle Church of Love in Bridgeport, Connecticut in the early 1970s. At its height, it had membership close to a thousand. A Black church, Prayer Tabernacle ran a day care and a Christian school. It offered shelter for men recently released from prison and for women who were unhoused. A street behind the church’s original building was honorarily named after Bishop Moales.
I spoke with Pastor Kenneth Moales Jr., Bishop Moales’s son, after Prayer Tabernacle filed bankruptcy. Pastor Moales described how the congregation’s growth created a need for the church to physically expand. Its “strong blue-collar low-middle-class” members were eager to see the church succeed and to provide support for the broader community. Prayer Tabernacle had accumulated funds, but it still needed a loan to construct a new building. Bishop Moales and Pastor Moales approached five different mainstream banks for a loan. All five banks turned them down, including their banking partner of thirty-five years.
Only then did Prayer Tabernacle start talking with two prominent Christian-based lenders, ultimately partnering with Foundation Capital Resources (FCR). At first, FCR spoke of faith and vision rather than of finances, asking for the church to craft a vision statement. FCR was slow to provide loan details, yet made demands from Prayer Tabernacle. FCR’s lending methods included “faith raising,” which required church members to make pledges of future contributions to Prayer Tabernacle, which would pay down the loan. FCR also helped Prayer Tabernacle with planning, design, and construction of the building.
At first, FCR funded the project quickly. Construction proceeded apace. FCR then began withdrawing money from Prayer Tabernacle’s account on a weekly basis, a very non-standard timetable for servicing a loan. Eventually, FCR stopped responding to Pastor Moales’s emails, presented a final loan figure with a seemingly high interest rate and overly onerous terms, and left the construction project unfinished. Last of all, they threatened to foreclose.
Prayer Tabernacle held on through years of precarious worship in a building under threat of foreclosure. It tried forbearance and attempted a predatory lending lawsuit, but eventually a state court judge ordered Prayer Tabernacle’s eviction for failure to pay FCR. At that point, the church owed much more to FCR than its original loan amount. Prayer Tabernacle filed chapter 11 as a final attempt to stave off foreclosure. In Prayer Tabernacle’s case, unfortunately, largely because of its timely confluence with the covid-19 pandemic, reorganization did not offer a solution—the bankruptcy judge dismissed the church’s case.
The Hesitant Embrace of Chapter 11
In contrast to Prayer Tabernacle’s case dismissal, churches overall have a surprisingly high success rate through reorganization, greater than that of small businesses. In Forgive Us Our Debts, I profile seven churches’ journeys to bankruptcy court and through the reorganization process, including that of Prayer Tabernacle. I supplement these stories with insights from the aggregate data of the totality of churches that sought to reorganize. In many cases, bankruptcy law and the reorganization process forced lenders to come to the negotiating table. Reorganization prompted lenders to give churches the deals that they probably should have gotten in the first place, either at loan origination or when churches came to lenders for assistance after financial setbacks. Overall, more than half of the churches continued operating in their spiritual homes post-reorganization and even more cases yielded money that congregations used to move down the street and remain worshiping together.
Still, although Black churches’ reorganization cases are remarkably successful, church leaders and members understood that they had to pay money and sacrifice time for these successes. Many churches seemingly should not have to turn to reorganization. The church lending market deserves a fuller conceptualization of how it fits within a continued history of wealth extraction from the Black community. The stakes are high, spiritually and financially; in the words of scholar Russell Rickford, the church has historically been “the paramount social institution in African-American life.” For now, Black churches’ best chance to retain their spiritual homes when faced with unyielding lenders remains the reorganization process and bankruptcy law.