A selection of worthy additions to your “important PDFs” folder.
Antitrust defendants increasingly prevail not by disproving competitive harm, but by dragging plaintiffs into costly battles over market definition. As courts have broadened the rule of reason and complicated the evidentiary standards for proving market power, these threshold fights have become a structural barrier to antitrust enforcement.
Over the past year, the much-touted right-wing embrace of anti-monopolism has been reduced to a distant memory. What has emerged instead is a personalist form of market governance, where regulatory authority persists only insofar as it serves the ambitions of political insiders.
As Republicans tightened work requirements and eligibility rules for Medicaid and SNAP last year, Equifax’s CEO openly celebrated the profits to be made from administering this deprivation. Means-testing and administrative complexity have turned America’s safety net into a lucrative revenue stream for monopolistic private contractors, underscoring the need for public data infrastructure and simpler eligibility rules.
In the recent exchange between the Marxists and the antitrusters, much of the disagreement has turned on different understandings of the project of antitrust reform. What is its animating goal? Is antitrust a substitute or complement to other forms of regulation? And how does antitrust relate to broader political movements? Identifying rival stances that one might take on these questions can help clarify this debate, while also showing how antitrust law can serve as an instrument for democratizing economic life.
As hospice care is increasingly dominated by private equity firms, an antitrust response, while necessary, has the potential to normalize the language of the market as the default mode for discussing healthcare reform. Hospice demonstrates what is lost when healthcare is described as a mere economic exchange, and Medicare’s per diem hospice benefit harbors as-yet-unrealized potential for decommodification.
Antitrust may promise to tame corporate power, but it leaves untouched the deeper logic of capitalism that compels production for profit’s sake. In this sense, antitrust is not voluntarist enough, choosing to fight capital with one hand tied behind its back. At the same time, however, antitrust places too much faith in law as a source of normative authority and in an administrative state whose legitimacy is evaporating before our eyes.
Some on the left dismiss anti-monopolism as a distraction from the core conflict between labor and capital. But this view misunderstands both history and strategy: antitrust has long been a tool for democratizing economic power, and it remains essential for resisting attempts to control economic production wherever and whenever it occurs.
In the United States and elsewhere, the forces of monopoly, antitrust, and corporate power tend to follow a certain historical pattern, with long-term swings between strong anti-monopoly policies and pro-business policies. To anticipate the future of anti-monopoly politics, we need to understand the dynamic forces that drive these recurring large-scale shifts between monopoly and competition.
Antitrust law is important not only for its potential in reforming our current economic system, but also analytically, because of law’s irreducible role in structuring economic competition and coordination. Contra any picture of markets operating via quasi-automatic mechanisms, the organization and operations of any market are as much a product of contingent rules as any law of nature.
How should we understand the relationship between Marxism and antitrust? To what extent do these traditions involve conflicting methods and assumptions? And, despite their differences, can we imagine a constructive give and take, where the two intellectual programs nonetheless align into a useful division of labor?
In a stunning betrayal of 30 million workers, the Federal Trade Commission has abandoned its nationwide ban on non-compete agreements. Fortunately, states are filling the void with remarkable creativity — drawing on both new legislation and existing competition and consumer laws to enhance worker mobility.
For the half-million people in the U.S. with kidney failure, survival rests in the hands of two powerful corporations — DaVita and Fresenius — that control over 70% of the outpatient dialysis market. But the history of dialysis isn’t a simple narrative of corporate consolidation; it’s a case study of how public funding can entrench private power in health care.
From the dialysis market to the pharmaceutical industry, health care is seeing growing consolidation and corporatization. Over the next month, this symposium will explore the financialization of various health care industries and begin to sketch the contours of a progressive pushback—how law, policy, and regulatory action can help erect guardrails to protect us from both illness and insolvency.
Attempts to solve the affordable housing crisis rely on a flawed understanding of housing economics and landlord business practices. In reality, landlords are colluding to manipulate the market. Antitrust law could be the answer.
